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Abstract
Gale and Shapley’s college admission problem and concept of stability [13] have been ex-
tensively studied, applied, and extended. In school choice problems, mechanisms often aim to
obtain an assignment that is more favorable to students. We investigate two extensions intro-
duced in this context – legal assignments [24] and the EADAM algorithm [18] – through the lens
of classical theory of stable matchings. In any instance, the set L of legal assignments is known
to contain all stable assignments. We prove that L is exactly the set of stable assignments in
another instance, and that essentially any optimization problem over L can be solved within
the same time bound needed for solving them over the set of stable assignments. A key tool for
these results is an algorithm that finds the student-optimal legal assignment. We then gener-
alize our algorithm to obtain the output of EADAM with any given set of consenting students
without sacrificing the running time, hence improving over known algorithms in both theory
and practice. Lastly, we investigate how larger the set L can be compared to the set of stable
matchings in the one-to-one case, and connect legal matchings with certain concepts and open
problems in the literature.
Keywords: stable matchings, distributive lattice, rotations, school choice problem, legal assignments,
EADAM algorithm, Latin marriages.
1 Introduction
Stable matchings and stable assignments are fundamental paradigms in operations research and the design of
matching markets. Since the seminal work of Gale and Shapley [13], these concepts have received widespread
attention for their mathematical elegance and broad applicability (see e.g. [15, 28, 30]). Those two facets
are tightly connected. A detailed understanding of the lattice structure of stable matchings led to many fast
algorithms for e.g. enumerating all stable matchings [14] and finding a stable matching that maximizes some
linear profit function [16]. In turns, these algorithmic results propel the application of stable matchings to
many matching markets, such as college admission, assignment of residents to hospitals [27], and kidney
transplant [29].
One of the most important applications, the school choice problem, considers the assignment of high
school students to public schools. After the pioneering work of Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [1], many school
districts, such as New York City and Boston, subsequently adopted the student-optimal stable mechanism
for its fairness (no priority violation or stability) and strategy-proofness (for students). The mechanism
asks students to report their (strict) preferences of the schools and schools to report their priorities1 (pref-
erences with ties) over the students. It then randomly breaks ties in the latter to obtain an instance of the
1Priorities are preferences with ties, as schools usually rank students based on categorical information such as
demographics, test scores, etc.
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stable assignment problem and performs the Gale-Shapley algorithm2 to obtain the student-optimal stable
assignment.
However, in this setting, schools are often perceived as commodities, and only students’ welfare matters.
Hence, enforcing stability implies a loss of efficiency. Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. [2] demonstrate the magnitude
of such efficiency loss with empirical data from the New York City school system, where over 4,000 eigth
graders in their sample could improved their assignments if stability constraints were relaxed. Striving to
regain this loss in welfare for the students, many alternative concepts and mechanisms have therefore been
introduced and extensively studied (see e.g. [3, 11, 18, 19, 24]).
Those mechanisms lead therefore to solutions outside the well-structured set of stable matchings. As a
consequence, ad-hoc structural studies and algorithms must be presented. Unfortunately, properties of the
former and performance of the latter rarely match theory of and algorithms for stable matchings [18, 19, 31].
This harms the applicability of such mechanisms, especially if school districts were to address two of the
major concerns economists have regarding the current school choice design. One concern is that the way ties
are broken in priorities affects the quality of the outcome [11]. The other concern is that the constraint on
the number of schools a student can rank [26] puts mechanisms at risk of manipulation [7]. Hence, if school
districts were to remove the capping on the number of choices and/or were to test different tiebreakers,
fast algorithms for those alternative mechanisms and an improved understanding of the structure of feasible
solutions would be useful in applications.
This paper focuses on two concepts introduced to regain the loss of welfare in the school choice prob-
lem: legal assignments [24] and EADAM with consent [18]. Legal assignments form a superclass of stable
assignments. They share many interesting properties with stable assignments, e.g. lattice structure and
consequently the existence of a student-optimal legal assignment. EADAM operates by iteratively asking for
students’ consent to “waive” their priority at certain schools and re-run the Gale-Shapley algorithm. The
output of EADAM is constrained efficient [31]. That is, the assignment does not violate any nonconsenting
students’ priorities, but any other assignment that is weakly preferred by all students does. Hence, when all
students consent, the output of EADAM is Pareto efficient for students, and it is known to coincide with
the student-optimal legal assignment [24].
The goal of our paper is to use classical theory of stable matchings to achieve a better structural and
algorithmic understanding of these two extensions. In fact, although both EADAM and legal assignments
have been further analyzed and extended by several authors (see e.g. [8, 10, 19, 4, 32]), our knowledge of
those two concepts is far from complete. In particular, the knowledge of a lattice structure alone gives
little information on how to exploit it for algorithmic purposes, e.g. how to find the legal assignment that
maximizes some linear profit function3. Moreover, little is known on how to exploit the structure of legal
assignments to obtain the output of EADAM when not all students consent, since the output assignment
may not be legal.
1.1 Our Contribution
Our first contribution deals with the structure of legal assignments. We prove in Section 3 that the set
of legal assignments coincide with that of stable assignments in a subinstance of the original one. Hence,
legal assignments inherit all structural properties of stable assignments. This result, in particular, greatly
simplifies the treatment from [24], where the lattice structure is proved from scratch.
As our second contribution, in Section 6 we show how to obtain the aforementioned subinstance in time
linear in the number of edges of the input. Hence, in order to solve an optimization problem over the set of
legal assignments (e.g. to find the already mentioned school-optimal, or other assignments of interest as the
egalitarian, profit-optimal, minimum regret), one can resort to the broad literature on algorithms developed
for the same problem on the set of stable assignments (see e.g. [23] for a collection of those results). Since
the worst-case running time of those algorithm is at least linear in the number of the edges, the complexity
of those problems over the set of legal assignments does not exceed their complexity over the set of stable
assignments. To achieve this second contribution, we first extend classical concepts of rotations and rotation
2In some literature, Gale-Shapley algorithm is referred to as Deferred acceptance. In this paper, we stick to
Gale-Shapley.
3A typical example are strongly stable matchings, which have been known for a long time to form a distributive
lattice [22], but only recently was this structure exploited for algorithmic purposes [21].
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digraphs in Section 4; we then developed a pair of algorithms in Section 5, which we name rotate-remove
(Algorithm 1) and reverse rotate-remove (Algorithm 2), that respectively find the school-optimal and
student-optimal legal assignments.
Our third contribution is a fast algorithm for EADAM with consent. Algorithmic results above imply
that, when all students consent, EADAM can be implemented as to run with the same time complexity as
that of Gale-Shapley’s. However, when only some students consent, the output of EADAM may no longer
be legal (see Example 7.3). We show in Section 7 how to modify reverse rotate-remove to produce the
output of EADAM again within the same time bound as Gale-Shapley’s. Computational tests performed in
Section 7.5 confirm that our algorithms run significantly faster in practice.
As last contribution, we show that relaxing the stability condition to legality can greatly increase the
size of the set of feasible matchings. We provide instances with one stable matching and exponentially many
(in the number of men and women) legal matchings. This is achieved by an exploration of the connection
between legal matchings and Latin marriages, introduced by [6] in relationship with a classical, long-standing
open question of Knuth [20] on the maximum number of stable matchings an instance can have. We defer
details to Section 8.
Our algorithm implementation for (1) finding student-optimal and school-optimal legal assignments and
for obtaining the legal subinstance; and for (2) EADAM with consent can be found online4.
We remark that our work is completely self-contained, except for classical results on stable matchings
that can be found e.g. in [15] and, for results in Section 7 and Section 8, facts on EADAM from Tang and
Yu [31] and on Latin instances from [6], respectively.
1.2 Literature Review
There is a vast amount of literature on mechanism design for the school choice problem, balancing their
focus among strategy-proofness, efficiency and stability. From a theoretical prospective, Ergin [12] shows
that under certain acyclicity conditions on the priority structure, the student-optimal stable assignment is
also Pareto efficient for the students. Kesten [18] interprets these cycles as the existence of interrupting pairs
and proposes the EADAM mechanism, which improves efficiency while simultaneously maintaining stability
by obtaining students’ consent to waive their priorities.
Extending upon Kesten’s framework, many researchers offer new perspectives. Tang and Yu [31] pro-
pose a simplified algorithm for EADAM, which repeatedly runs Gale-Shapley algorithm after fixing the
assignments of underdemanded schools. Bando [5] shows an algorithm which iteratively runs Gale-Shapley
algorithm after fixing the assignments of the set of last proposers. Bando [5] also shows that when restrict-
ing to one-to-one setting, his algorithm finds the student-optimal von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable
matching. vNM stable set is a concept proposed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [33] for cooperative
games. In the college admission problem, the definition of legal assignments by Morrill [24] corresponds to
vNM stable set. In one-to-one setting, results from [9] and [34] show existence and uniqueness of the vNM
stable set. Morrill [24] further proves the existence and uniqueness result in the one-to-many setting, as
well as the fact that they have a lattice structure. Wako [34] presents an algorithm that finds the man- and
woman-optimal vNM stable matchings, and show that vNM stable matchings coincide with stable match-
ings in another instance. However, Wako [34] points out that his algorithm does not directly apply to the
one-to-many setting, and he poses as an open question to find one such algorithm.
Our results answer this open question. We remark that, although there is a standard reduction of one-
to-many instances to one-to-one instances [15, 28] such that the set of stable assignments of the former
and the set of stable matchings of the latter correspond, such one-to-one mapping fails for the set of legal
assignments (see Example 3.2). So we need to directly tackle the one-to-many setting.
2 Basic Mathematical Models
We introduce here basic notions and facts. We point readers to the book by Gusfield and Irving [15] for a
more comprehensive introduction on stable marriage and stable assignment problems.
4(1). https://github.com/xz2569/LegalAssignments. (2).https://github.com/xz2569/FastEADAM.
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For n ∈ N, we denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}. All (di)graphs in this paper are simple. All paths
and cycles in (di)graphs are therefore uniquely determined by the sequence of nodes they traverse, and are
denoted using this sequence, e.g. a0, b0, a1, b1, · · · . We call a sequence of distinct nodes x1, x2, . . . , xk a chain
of a digraph D if for each i ∈ [k − 1], (xi, xi+1) is an arc of D. The edge connecting two nodes a, b in an
undirected graph is denoted by ab. For a graph G(V,E) and F ⊆ E, we denote by G[F ] := G(V, F ). A
singleton of a graph is a node of degree 0. For sets S, S′, S4S′ denotes their symmetric difference.
2.1 Stable Marriage Problem
An instance of the stable marriage problem is a pair (G,<) where G is a bipartite graph with bipartition
(A,B) and < denotes {<v}v∈V , with <v being a strict ordering of the neighbors of v in G. Elements of A
are referred to as men, and elements of B as women. For a ∈ A, b, b′ ∈ B, we say a strictly prefers b to b′
if b >a b
′, and we say that a prefers b to b′ and write b ≥a b′ if b >a b′ or b = b′. Similar definitions are
employed for a >b a
′ and a ≥b a′. If a ∈ A and b ∈ B are matched in matching M , we say that a and b
are partners in M and we write b = M(a) and a = M(b). If x ∈ A ∪ B is not matched in M , we write
M(x) = ∅. If M(a) >a M ′(a) (resp. M(a) ≥a M ′(a)), we say that a strictly prefers (resp. prefers) M to M ′
and similarly for b. A pair (a, b) ∈ A × B is said to block a matching M , or to be a blocking pair for M , if
a >b M(b) and b >a M(a). In particular, a blocking pair is an edge of G. Hence, we often drop the brackets
and simply write ab, also omitting to specify each time that a ∈ A and b ∈ B. Similarly, we say that any
matching containing ab blocks M . A matching M is stable for (G,<) if there is no edge of G that blocks
M . We denote by M(G) the set of matchings of G, and S(G,<) as the set of stable matchings of (G,<).
2.2 Stable Assignment Problem
An instance of the stable assignment problem, also know as the college assignment problem, is a triple (G,<,q)
where G and < are defined as in the stable marriage problem, and q = {qb}b∈B ∈ NB denotes the maximum
number of vertices in A that can be assigned to each b ∈ B. qb is called the quota of b. Elements of A are
referred to as students and elements of B as schools. The definition of a prefers b to b′, or b ≥a b′ and of the
symmetric concepts for b ∈ B are immediate extension of the equivalent concepts in the marriage case.
An assignment M for an instance (G,<,q) is a collection of edges of G such that: at most one edge
of M is incident to a for each a ∈ A; at most qb edges of M are incident to b for each b ∈ B. We write
M(b) = {a : ab ∈M}. We call ab a blocking pair for M if b >a M(a), and either a >b a′ for some a′ ∈M(b)
or |M(b)| < qb. In this case, we say that ab blocks M , and similarly, we say that M ′ blocks M for every
assignment M ′ containing edge ab. An assignment is stable if it is not blocked by any edge of G. Extending
the notations from the stable marriage problem, let M(G,q) be the set of assignments of (G,q), and let
S(G,<,q) be the set of stable assignments of (G,<,q). For a subgraph G′ of G, we denote by (G′, <,q)
the stable assignment instance whose preference lists are those induced by < on G′ and quotas are those
obtained by restricting q to nodes in G′.
Asssignments output by Gale-Shapley’s algorithm(s) play a special role. We refer e.g. to [15] for details
on those algorithms.
Theorem 2.1. The student-proposing (resp. school-proposing) Gale-Shapley algorithm outputs a stable as-
signment M0 (resp. Mz) such that M0(a) ≥a M ′(a) (resp. M ′(a) ≥a Mz(a)) for any a ∈ A and stable
assignment M ′.
2.3 Reduction: Stable Marriages to Stable Assignments
A stable assignment instance (G,<,q) can be transformed into a stable marriage problem (HG, <G) via
the following well-known reduction [15, 28]. For each school b ∈ B, create qb copies of b, say b1, . . . , bqb ,
and replace b in the preference list of each adjacent a ∈ A by the qb copies in exactly this order. The
preference list of each bi is identical to the preference list of b. We call these copies seats of the schools
and denote their collection by BH . With this reduction, we can construct a map pi : M(G,q) → M(HG)
that induces a bijection between S(G,<,q) and S(HG, <G). Given M ∈ M(G,q), assume for some b ∈ B,
M(b) = {a1, . . . , aj} and a1 >b a2 >b · · · >b aj . Define pi(M)(bi) = ai for i ∈ [j] and pi(M)(bi) = ∅ for
i ∈ (j, qb]. For the sake of shortness, we often abbreviate MH = pi(M).
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3 Legal Assignments are Stable Assignments in Disguise
Throughout the section, we fix an instance (G,<,q) of the stable assignment problem and letM :=M(G,q),
S := S(G,<,q). For a set M′ ⊆ M, define I(M′) as the set of assignments that are blocked by some
assignment M ′ ∈M′ and define L(M′) as the set of assignments that are not blocked by any assignment in
M\I(M′). That is, L(M′) :=M\I(M\I(M′)). We say a setM′ has the legal property if I(M′) =M\M′.
We devote this section to the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let (G,<,q) be an instance of the stable assignment problem. There exists a unique set
L ⊆ M(G,q) that has the legal property. We call L the set of legal assignments. This set coincides with
the set of stable assignments in (GL, <,q), where GL is a subgraph of G. Moreover, E(GL) = ∪{M : M ∈
S(GL, <,q)} = ∪{M : M ∈ L}.
As introduced in Section 2, there is a one-to-one correspondence between stable assignments in (G,<
,q) and stable matchings in the reduced instance (HG, <G). One could think of proving Theorem 3.1 by
showing the (simpler) results for the stable marriage instance (HG, <G), and then deducing the set of legal
assignments of (G,<,q) from the set of legal matchings of (HG, <G). Unfortunately, the bijection between
stable assignments and stable matchings does not extend to the legal setting, as next example shows.
Example 3.2. Consider an instance with 4 students and 2 schools, each with 2 seats. Let ai, bi, b
j
i represent
students, schools, and seats respectively. The preference lists are given as follows. In this and all following
examples, when it is clear whose preference list we are referring to, the subscript in > is dropped.
a1 : b1 > b2 b1 : a3 > a4 > a2 > a1
a2 : b2 > b1 b2 : a2 > a4 > a3 > a1
a3 : b2 > b1
a4 : b1 > b2
Since all preference lists are complete, we can restrict our attention to the 6 assignments where all
students are matched. One can easily verify that M = {a1b1, a2b2, a3b2, a4b1} is the only stable assignment,
and all other assignments are blocked by some pair in M , hence they are all illegal. Thus, L = {M}. Now,
consider the reduction to the stable marriage problem. The preference lists can be expanded:
a1 : b
1
1 > b
2
1 > b
1
2 > b
2
2 b
1
1 : a3 > a4 > a2 > a1
a2 : b
1
2 > b
2
2 > b
1
1 > b
2
1 b
2
1 : a3 > a4 > a2 > a1
a3 : b
1
2 > b
2
2 > b
1
1 > b
2
1 b
1
2 : a2 > a4 > a3 > a1
a4 : b
1
1 > b
2
1 > b
1
2 > b
2
2 b
2
2 : a2 > a4 > a3 > a1
The corresponding matchings and their blocking pairs are:
matchings blocking pairs classification
M1H {a1b21, a2b11, a3b22, a4b12} a2b12, a2b22, a4b11, a4b21 illegal
M2H {a1b21, a2b12, a3b11, a4b22} a4b21 legal
M3H {a1b21, a2b12, a3b22, a4b11} none stable
M4H {a1b22, a2b21, a3b11, a4b12} a2b12, a2b22, a3b22, a4b21 illegal
M5H {a1b22, a2b21, a3b12, a4b11} a2b12, a2b22 illegal
M6H {a1b22, a2b12, a3b11, a4b21} a3b22 illegal
M3H is the only stable matching. All other matchings except for M2H are blocked by some edge in M3H
(underlined). Hence, one easily verifies that L = {M2H ,M3H}, but pi−1(M2H) 6= M . ♦
Before proving Theorem 3.1, we show some preliminary results. The proof of Lemma 3.5 is immediate
from Lemma 4.3. However, the proof of the latter requires concepts and machinery developed later in
Section 4 – hence, we postpone the proof of Lemma 3.5 to that section.
Lemma 3.3. Consider an instance of stable marriage problem (G,<) with G = G(A ∪B,E). Let M,M ′ ∈
M(G). Call an edge ab ∈ M ∪M ′ irregular if both a and b strictly prefer M to M ′ or both strictly prefer
M ′ to M . Suppose M does not block M ′ and M ′ does not block M . Then:
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1) there are no irregular edges;
2) G[M4M ′] is a disjoint union of singletons and cycles;
3) a node is matched in M if and only if it is matched in M ′.
Proof. 1) Assume a1b1 is an irregular edge and assume wlog both endpoints strictly prefer M to M
′.
Then a1b1 ∈M ′, because otherwise M blocks M ′. Starting from i = 2, iteratively define ai = M(bi−1) and
bi = M
′(ai). Repeatedly using the assumption that M and M ′ do not block each other, we deduce that,
for all i ≥ 2, ai strictly prefers M ′ to M , and vice versa bi strictly prefers M to M ′. Moreover, ai 6= ∅ and
bi 6= ∅. Since M , M ′ are matchings, there exists ` ≥ 2 such that a` = a1. Hence, a1 = a` strictly prefers M ′
to M , a contradiction.
2) Note that the degree of each node in G[M4M ′] is at most 2. Suppose the thesis does not hold,
then G[M4M ′] contains a path, say wlog a1, b1, a2, b2, · · · , whose endpoints have degree 1 in G[M4M ′].
Assume wlog that a1b1 ∈ M ′. Since a1 is unmatched in M , a1 strictly prefers M ′ to M . In addition, since
a1b1 ∈ M ′ does not block M , b1 strictly prefers M to M ′. We can iterate and conclude, similarly to part
1), that all nodes ai strictly prefer M
′ to M , and vice versa all nodes bi strictly prefer M to M ′. Suppose
first that akbk is the last edge of the path. Then bk strictly prefers M
′ to M as akbk ∈M ′ and M(bk) = ∅,
a contradiction. Similarly, if the last edge is bkak+1, ak+1 strictly prefers M as ak+1 is unmatched in M
′,
again a contradiction.
3) Immediately from 2). 
Lemma 3.4. Let (G(A∪B,E), <,q) be an instance of the stable assignment problem. Let M,M ′ ∈M(G,q)
be such that M does not block M ′, and M ′ does not block M . Fix a ∈ A that is matched in M . Then a is
matched in M ′. Let therefore b = M(a), b = M ′(a). If b >a b, then there exists a ∈ M(b) such that a >b a
and b >a M
′(a).
Proof. We first claim that M ′H does not block MH , and MH does not block M
′
H , where MH = pi(M) and
pi is the mapping defined in Section 2. It then follows from Lemma 3.3, part 3) and the definition of mapping
pi that a is matched in M ′. It is enough to show that M ′H does not block MH . Assume by contradiction
that there exists abi ∈ M ′H that blocks MH . That means bi >a MH(a) and a >bi MH(bi). If MH(a) = bj1
where b1 6= b, then b >a M(a), a >b a′ for some a′ ∈M(b), and thus ab ∈M ′ blocks M , a contradiction. So
assume MH(a) = b
j for some j ∈ [qb]. Since bi >a bj , we have j > i by construction of (HG, <G). Then by
the definition of pi, MH(b
i) >b MH(b
j) = a, a contradiction.
Let bi := M ′H(a) and b
` := MH(a). By Lemma 3.3, part 2), there exists a cycle C = a, b
`, ..., bi in
HG[M
′
H4MH ], and this cycle has no irregular edges. Since b` >a bi, (i) all nodes from A ∩ C strictly
prefer MH to M
′
H , and vice-versa (ii) all nodes from BH ∩ C strictly prefer M ′H to MH . Recall that
BH is the collection of seats in the reduced instance (HG, <G). Let b
j ∈ C be such that all nodes of
C ∩ BH that precede bj in C are not seats of b, while all nodes that follow bj in C ∩ BH are seats of
b. Note that bj is well-defined, since C terminates with bi (hence possibly j = i). Let a := MH(b
j),
i.e. C = a, b`, · · · , a, bj , · · · , bi. By (i) above, bj = MH(a) >a M ′H(a), hence b >a M ′(a), as required.
Moreover, a = MH(b
j) <bj M
′
H(b
j) ≤bj M ′H(bi) = a (where the strict preference follows from (ii) and the
non-strict one from the definition of mapping pi), hence a >b a, as required. 
Lemma 3.5. Let (G,<,q) be an instance of the stable assignment problem. Let ab be an edge of G that is
not in any stable assignment. Assume that there exist stable assignments M1 and M2 such that M1(a) >a b
and b >a M2(a). Then, there exists a stable assignment M
′ such that M ′(a) >a b and a′ >b a for all
a′ ∈M ′(b).
The previous facts on stable assignments will prove useful for the proof of Theorem 3.1. Lemmas 3.6
and 3.10 mirror similar ones that already appeared in [24], but we prove them here within our framework to
make our treatment self-contained. Define L0 = S and iteratively Li = L(Li−1) for i ∈ N.
Lemma 3.6. There exists k ∈ N such that Lk = Lk+1.
Proof. For i ∈ N ∪ {0}, let Ii = I(Li). We show by induction on i that Li ⊆ Li+1, which concludes the
proof. Clearly L0 = S ⊆ L1. Now fix i ∈ N. Since Li−1 ⊆ Li, we deduce Ii ⊇ Ii−1. Hence,
Li+1 = L(Li) =M\ I(M\ Ii) ⊇M\ I(M\ Ii−1) = Li,
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where in the containment relation we use Ii ⊇ Ii−1 and therefore I(M\ Ii) ⊆ I(M\ Ii−1). 
For k ∈ N that satisfies Lemma 3.6, we let L := Lk. For M′ ⊆M, let E(M′) := ∪{M : M ∈ M′} and
E(M′) := ∪{M : M ∈M \M′}.
Lemma 3.7. AssumeM0 ⊆M satisfies L(M0) =M0. ThenM0 = S(G′, <,q), where G′ := G[E(I(M0))].
Proof. Suppose M ∈ M \M0 =M\L(M0). Then there is a matching M ′ ∈ M \ I(M0) and an edge
e ∈ M ′ that blocks M . But then e ∈ ∪{M : M ∈ M \ I(M0)} = E(I(M0)). Hence, M /∈ S(G′, <,q).
Conversely, suppose M ∈ M \ S(G′, <,q). If M ∈ M(G′,q), then M is blocked by some e ∈ E(I(M0)).
This means a matching in M\ I(M0) blocks M , implying M /∈ L(M0) =M0. If M /∈ M(G′,q), then M
contains an edge that is not in E(G′). This implies M ∈ I(M0) and thus M /∈ L(M0) =M0. 
Lemma 3.8. E(GL) = ∪{M : M ∈ L}, where GL = G[E(I(L))].
Proof. The containment relationship E(GL) ⊇ ∪{M : M ∈ L} is clear from definition. So it suffices to
show E(GL) ⊆ ∪{M : M ∈ L}. Assume by contradiction that there exists an edge ab ∈ E(GL)\∪{M : M ∈
L}. Let M ∈ M \ I(L) be an assignment such that ab ∈ M . Let M0 (resp. Mz) be the stable assignment
output by the students (resp. schools) proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm in GL. Since L = L(L), we have
M0,Mz ∈ L by Lemma 3.7. By construction, ab /∈M0 ∪Mz. In the following, when talking about a specific
execution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, we say that a rejects b if during the execution, a rejects the proposal
by b, possibly after having temporarily accepted it. We distinguish three cases.
Case a): b >a M0(a) =: b. By the choice of M , we know that M0 and M do not block each other. Note
that this case contains all and only the edges that have been rejected by some (equivalently, any) execution
of the student-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm on GL. Among all those edges, pick the one ab that is last
rejected by some execution of the algorithm. Apply Lemma 3.4 (with M = M and M ′ = M0) and conclude
that there exists a ∈ M(b) such that a >b a and b >a M0(a). b >a M0(a) implies that b rejected a during
the execution of Gale-Shapley in consideration. Hence, when a proposes to b, either a still has to be rejected
by b, or it has been rejected before. In the latter case, b has her quota filled and rejects some other student
when a proposes. Hence the following events happen in this order during the execution of Gale-Shapley: a
is rejected by b; a proposes to b; b rejects a student. This contradicts our assumption that ab is the last
rejected edge.
Case b): M0(a) >a b >a Mz(a). By Lemma 3.5, there exists a stable assignment M
′ such that
M ′(a) >a b and a′ >b a for all a′ ∈ M ′(b). Again by choice of M , M and M ′ do not block each other.
We can therefore apply Lemma 3.4 (with the roles of M and M ′ inverted) and conclude that there exists
a ∈M ′(b) with a >b a, a contradiction.
Case c): Mz(a) >a b. Using Lemma 3.4 (with M = Mz and M
′ = M) we deduce that there exists
a ∈ Mz(b) such that a >b a and b >a M(a) = b. Hence, in some (equivalently, any) iteration of the school-
proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm, a rejects b. Since this is the last case that still needs to be considered,
we may assume edges E(GL) \ ∪{M : M ∈ L} are exactly those rejected by some execution of the school-
proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. Among all such edges, take ab that is the last rejected by some execution.
Applying Lemma 3.4 again (with a = a, M = Mz, M
′ = M), we know a >b a
′ for some a′ ∈ Mz(b). This
implies that a rejected b during the execution of Gale-Shapley in consideration. Hence, when b proposes to
a, either b still has to be rejected by a, or it has been rejected before. In the latter case, when b proposes
to a, a rejects the school it temporarily accepted. Hence, the following events happen during the considered
execution in this order: a rejects b; b proposes to a; a rejects a school, contradicting the choice of ab. 
Lemma 3.9. L has the legal property. That is, I(L) =M\L.
Proof. Clearly I(L) ⊆M\L. Now take M ∈M\ I(L). Then M ⊆ ∪{M ′ : M ′ ∈M\ I(L)} = E(GL).
Hence, M is an assignment of GL not blocked by any assignment from L = S(GL, <,q), where the last
equality holds by Lemma 3.7. By Lemma 3.8, M is not blocked by any edge in E(GL), and we conclude
that M ∈ S(GL, <,q) = L. 
Because of Lemma 3.9, we say that (L, I :=M\L) is a legal partition of M.
Lemma 3.10. L is the unique subset of M with the legal property.
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Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists a set L′ ⊆ M, L′ 6= L with the legal property. Let
I ′ :=M\L′. If L ( L′, we must have I ′ ( I. Take any M ∈ I \I ′, it must be blocked by some assignment
in L ( L′. But we also have M ∈ L′, which contradicts the assumption that L′ has the legal property.
Similarly, we cannot have L′ ( L. Thus, sets A := {M : M ∈ I ∩ L′} and B := {M : M ∈ L ∩ I ′} are both
non-empty. In addition, let C := L ∩ L′. It is also non-empty because all stable assignments are contained
in any set with the legal property. In particular, L0 ⊆ C. Note that every assignment in B is blocked by
some assignment from A. Moreover, (†) no assignments from A∪B can be blocked by any assignments from
C. Now take the first i ∈ N such that Li ∩ B 6= ∅, and note that i ≥ 1. Let M ∈ Li ∩ B. All assignments
blocking M must be contained in I(Li−1). Thus, we can pick M ′ ∈ I(Li−1) ∩ A. Hence, M ′ is blocked by
some assignment in Li−1 ⊆ C (containment relation due to the choice of i), contradicting (†). 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Immediately from Lemmas 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10. 
Since a graph may have exponentially many assignments, we cannot efficiently deduce graph GL by
explicitly keeping track of L0,L1, · · · , etc. In Section 6, we will show an O(|E|) algorithm for computing
GL. Some machinery for this algorithm is developed in Section 4 and Section 5.
We then introduce the classical concept of rotations in stable marriages and investigate its extension to
stable assignments.
4 Lattice and Rotations
In this section, we first present the known lattice structure associated to stable assignments. We then
introduce and investigate an extension of the classical concept of rotations from stable marriage (see e.g. [15])
to stable assignment. Due to the natural asymmetry of the problem, we distinguish between school- and
student-rotations, treated in Section 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. For the sake of readability, we keep technical
details to the minimum, postponing most of them to the appendix, which also includes a treatment of
rotations in the marriage case. Even though definitions we introduce do not explicitly rely on the latter,
proofs do so extensively, and are therefore also deferred to the appendix. The main take-home message of
this section is the following. Informally speaking, a rotation exposed in a stable matching M is a certain
M -alternating cycle C such that M4C is a stable matching. We show in this section that rotations in
the stable marriage instance (HG, <G) associated to a stable assignment instance (G,<,q) (see Section 2.3)
behave in a very structured manner. Indeed, constructing M4C from M ∈ (HG, <G) will have the following
effect on MH ∈ S(G,<,q): each school b will either not change its assigned students, or replace its least
preferred student only. This allows us to define an extension of rotations directly on (G,<,q), and show
that it inherits many properties of rotations in the marriage setting.
Throughout the section, fix a stable assignment instance (G,<,q), with G = (A ∪B,E). We say a pair
ab ∈ A×B is stable if there exists a stable assignment where a is assigned to b. Given M,M ′ ∈M(G,<,q),
we say M dominates M ′ (and write M  M ′) if for every student a ∈ A, M(a) ≥a M ′(a). If moreover
M 6= M ′, we say that M strictly dominates M ′ and write M  M ′. The following fact is well-known (see
e.g. [15]).
Theorem 4.1. S(G,<,q) endowed with the dominance relation  forms a distributive lattice. The stable
assignment M0 (resp. Mz) such that M0 M (resp. M Mz) for all M ∈ S(G,<,q) is called the student-
optimal (resp. school-optimal) stable assignment. Moreover, if M,M ′ ∈ S(G,<,q) and M  M ′, then for
every school b ∈ B, a′ >b a for all a ∈M(b) \M ′(b) and a′ ∈M ′(b) \M(b).
Note that the student-optimal (resp. school-optimal) stable assignment coincides with the one output
by the Gale-Shapley algorithm with students (resp. schools) proposing, as described in Theorem 2.1 (hence,
the notation describing those assignments coincide).
4.1 Student-rotations
Let M ∈M(G,q). For a student a, define sM (a) to be the first school b 6= M(a) on a’s preference list such
that a >b a
′ for some a′ ∈ M(b). Note that if M ∈ S(G,<,q), we must have M(a) >a b. Also note that
such b might not exist. If sM (a) exists, define nextM (a) as the least preferred student sM (a) is assigned to
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in M , i.e. nextM (a) ∈ M(sM (a)) and for all a′′ ∈ M(sM (a)), a′′ ≥b nextM (a). Note that if sM (a) has no
assigned students then nextM (a) = ∅.
Given distinct a0, . . . , ar−1 ∈ A and b0, . . . , br−1 ∈ B, a cycle b0, a0, b1, a1, . . . , br−1, ar−1 of G is a student-
rotation exposed in M if aibi ∈ M , and sM (ai) = bi+1 for all i = 0, . . . , r − 1 (hence ai+1 = nextM (ai) –
indices are taken modulo r). Note that student-rotations exposed in M are in one-to-one correspondence with
directed cycles in the student-rotation digraph DA, with vertex set A∪{∅} and arcs {(a, nextM (a)) : a ∈ A}.
Given M ∈ S(G,<,q), and a rotation ρ = b0, a0, · · · , br−1, ar−1 exposed in M , define M ′ = M/ρ to be the
assignment where M ′(a) = M(a) for all a ∈ M \ ρ, and M ′(a) = {bi+1} if a = ai ∈ ρ (indices again are
taken modulo r). This mapping of M to M/ρ is called the elimination of ρ from M . The following lemmas
extend classical results on rotations in the marriage setting to the stable assignment setting.
Lemma 4.2. Let M ∈ S(G,<,q), ρ be a rotation exposed in M , and M ′ = M/ρ. Then M ′ ∈ S(G,<,q) and
M M ′. Moreover, every stable assignment can be generated by a sequence of student-rotation eliminations,
starting from the student-optimal stable assignment, and every such sequence contains the same student-
rotations.
Lemma 4.3. Let a ∈ A, b ∈ B. A pair ab is stable if and only if a is assigned to b in the school-optimal
stable assignment or, for some student-rotation b0, a0, b1, a1, · · · , br−1, ar−1 and some i ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}, we
have a = ai and b = bi. Equivalently, a pair ab is stable if and only if it is a pair in the student-optimal
stable assignment or for some student-rotation b0, a0, b1, a1, · · · , br−1, ar−1 and some i, we have a = ai and
b = bi+1.
We can now give the proof of Lemma 3.5.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. By Lemma 4.3, there exists a stable assignment M ′ and a student-rotation ρ =
b1, a, b2, a2, ... exposed in M
′ such that b1 >a b >a b2. By definition of student-rotation, we have ab1 ∈ M ′
and a′ >b a for all a′ ∈M ′(b). 
4.2 School-rotations
For M ∈ M(G,q) and b ∈ B, let sM (b) be the first student a on b’s preference list satisfying b >a M(a).
Note that if M ∈ S(G,<,q), we must have a′ >b a for all a′ ∈ M(b). If sM (b) exists, let also nextM (b) :=
M(sM (b)). Note that it is possible to have nextM (b) = ∅. Also note that, unlike in student-rotations, s and
next are defined over nodes of B. Hence, no confusion can arise with the notation.
Given distinct a0, . . . , ar−1 ∈ A and b0, . . . , br−1 ∈ B, a cycle a0, b0, a1, b1, . . . , ar−1, br−1 of G is a school-
rotation exposed in M if aibi ∈M and sM (bi) = ai+1 for all i = 0, . . . , r− 1 (indices are again taken modulo
r). Define the school-rotation digraph DB with vertices A∪B∪{∅} and arcs (b, a) and (a, b′) if sM (b) = a and
M(a) = b′ (hence nextM (b) = b′). School-rotations are in one-to-one correspondence with directed cycles
in DB . Note the asymmetry between the definition of DB and that of DA, whose vertices are all and only
the nodes in A. We include nodes of A in DB to keep track of sM (bi), which is otherwise not immediately
deducible from arcs in DB . The elimination of rotation ρ maps M to the assignment M
′ = M/ρ with
M ′(a) = M(a) for a ∈ A \ ρ and M ′(ai) = bi−1 for a = ai ∈ ρ. Moreover, note that if b, a = sM (b) belong
to a rotation ρ exposed at M , then a is the least preferred student of b in M/ρ.
When it is clear whether we are referring to the rotation digraph associated with students or schools, we
will simply say “rotation digraph”, dropping the prefix.
Lemma 4.4. Let M ∈ S(G,<,q). If there is a school-rotation ρ exposed in M , then M ′ = M/ρ ∈ S(G,<,q)
and M ≺ M ′. Conversely, if there is no school-rotation exposed in M , M is the student-optimal stable
assignment.
For an instance (G,<,q), we denote by R(G,<,q) the set of its student-rotations, and by SR(G,<,q)
the set of its school-rotations.
Lemma 4.5. |R(G,<,q)| = |SR(G,<,q)|. There is a bijection σ : R(G,<,q) → SR(G,<,q) such that
for each M ∈ S(G,<,q), ρ ∈ R(G,<,q), we have M = (M/ρ)/σ(ρ).
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5 Algorithms for Student- and School-Optimal Legal Assignments
This section is devoted to present fast algorithms for finding the student-optimal and the school-optimal
legal assignments, whose existence is implied by Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1.
Throughout the section, we again fix a stable assignment instance (G,<,q), with G = (A ∪ B,E). Let
GL be as defined in Theorem 3.1. We say an edge e ∈ E is legal if e ∈ E(GL), or illegal otherwise. We
denote by L(G,<,q) to be the set of legal assignments of instance (G,<,q) and by ML0 (resp. MLz ) the
student-optimal (resp. school-optimal) legal assignment.
We first introduce two algorithms, rotate-remove and reverse rotate-remove. We then show in
Section 5.2 that they output the school- and student-optimal legal assignments, respectively. Lastly, in
Section 5.3, we give an efficient implementation of the algorithms that shows they run in time complexity
O(|E|).
5.1 The Rotate-Remove and Reverse Rotate-Remove Algorithms
The key idea of rotate-remove relies on the following two lemmas, which enables us to identify illegal edges
and to eliminate them without changing the set of legal assignments. Note that ∅ is always a sink in the
rotation digraph, although it may be an isolated vertex.
Lemma 5.1. Let M ∈ S(G,<,q). If a is a sink in the student-rotation digraph DA of M and (a′, a) ∈
A(DA), then a
′b is an illegal edge where b = sM (a′).
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, M ∈ S(G,<,q) ⊆ L(G,<,q) = S(GL, <,q). In (GL, <,q), consider any
sequence of student-rotations, ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρk, whose elimination from M gives the school-optimal legal as-
signment MLz . The existence of such sequence follows from Lemma 4.2. Let M
i = M/ρ1/ · · · /ρi with
M0 = M . If a = ∅, by definition of student-rotations, we have b /∈ ρi for all i ∈ [k]. Now consider the
case where a 6= ∅. Since M i  M j for all i ≤ j, by Theorem 4.1, we have sMi(a) = ∅ in (GL, <,q) for
all i = 0, 1, · · · , k. We again have b /∈ ρi for all i ∈ [k]. Thus, we deduce M(b) = MLz (b). Now assume by
contradiction that a′b ∈ M ′ for some legal assignment M ′. Note that M and M ′ do not block each other
given that both are legal assignments. Moreover, since M(a′) >a′ b = M ′(a′) by construction of DA, we
can apply Lemma 3.4 (with a = a′, b = b) and conclude that there exist a ∈ M(b) such that b >a M ′(a).
However, M ′ MLz implies M ′(a) ≥a MLz (a) and a ∈M(b) implies MLz (a) = M(a) = b. Hence, M ′(a) ≥a b,
a contradiction. 
Lemma 5.2. Let e be an illegal edge of (G,<,q), and G˜ = G[E(G) \ {e}]. Then L = L(G˜, <,q).
Proof. LetM′ = {M ∈M : e ∈M}, and we knowM′ ⊆M\L by Theorem 4.1. Also let M˜ :=M(G˜, <
,q), and note that M˜ =M\M′. It is clear that (L,M˜ \ L) is a legal partition of M˜. By Lemma 3.10 on
the uniqueness of the legal partition, we have L(G˜, <,q) = L. 
Iteration i of the rotate-remove algorithm starts with a subgraph Gi of G and Mi ∈ S(Gi, <,q),
with G0 = G and M0 = Mz
5. Let DAi be the student-rotation digraph associated with Mi in (G
i, <,q).
During each iteration, the algorithm either identifies an exposed student-rotation from DAi and eliminates
it from Mi, or finds an illegal edge, by locating a sink in DAi , and removes it as to produce a new instance
(Gi+1, <,q). If both cases are present, we are free to choose between the two. When neither of these can be
found, the algorithm outputs the current assignment. We give a formal description in Algorithm 1.
Reverse rotate-remove is very similar to rotate-remove but deals with school-rotations and the
school-rotation digraph instead. Recall that the school-rotation digraph has nodes corresponding to both
students and schools, unlike the student-rotation digraph whose nodes are students only. We give a “school
version” of Lemma 5.1 below. Its proof, very similar to that of Lemma 5.1, is omitted. Algorithm 2 presents a
formal description of reverse rotate-remove. In Example 5.4, we show an application of both algorithms.
Lemma 5.3. Let M ∈ S(G,<,q). If b ∈ B is a sink in the school-rotation digraph DB of M and
(b′, a), (a, b) ∈ A(DB). Then ab′ is an illegal edge.
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Algorithm 1 rotate-remove for school-optimal legal assignment
Require: (G(A ∪B,E), <,q)
1: Let G0 = G.
2: Find the school-optimal stable assignment M0 of (G
0, <,q).
3: Set i = 0 and set DA0 to be the rotation digraph of M0 in (G
0, <,q).
4: while DAi still has an arc do
5: Find (i) a cycle Ci of DAi or (ii) an arc (a
′, a) ∈ A(DAi) where a is a sink in DAi .
6: if (i) is found then
7: Let ρi be the corresponding student-rotation. Set Mi+1 = Mi/ρ
i, and Gi+1 = Gi.
8: else if (ii) is found then
9: Define Gi+1 from Gi by removing a′sM (a′), and set Mi+1 = Mi.
10: end if
11: Set i = i+ 1 and set DAi to be the rotation digraph of Mi in (G
i, <,q).
12: end while
13: Output Mi.
Example 5.4. We apply rotate-remove and reverse rotate-remove to the following instance with 6
students and 3 schools, where each school has a quota of 2.
a1 : b2 > b3 > b1 b1 : a1 > a4 > a3 > a5 > a2 > a6
a2 : b1 > b2 > b3 b2 : a3 > a2 > a6 > a1 > a5 > a4
a3 : b3 > b1 > b2 b3 : a6 > a1 > a5 > a2 > a4 > a3
a4 : b1 > b2 > b3
a5 : b3 > b2 > b1
a6 : b1 > b3 > b2
The stable student- and school-optimal stable assignments coincide, and are given by {a1b2, a2b2, a3b1,
a4b1, a5b3, a6b3} (squared entries above).
Rotate-remove. On a1’s preference list, b3 is the first school after M0(a1). In addition, b3 prefers a1 to a5,
who is b3’s least preferred student among M0(b3). Thus, sM0(a1) = b3 and nextM0(a1) = a5. After working
out nextM0(·) of all the students, we have the rotation digraph DA0 for the first iteration of rotate-remove:
a3
a6
a1 a5 a2 a4
Here, we find a case (ii) with a′ = a1 and a = a5. So we set M1 = M0, remove a′M0(a) = a1b3 from the
instance, and update the rotation digraph DA1 for the next iteration:
5Note that here we are overloading notation, since M0 in the algorithm represents the assignment at the 0
th
iteration, and should not be confused with the student-optimal stable assignment. Since most of the time we will
deal with reverse-rotate-remove this overload of notation will not appear again.
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Algorithm 2 reverse rotate-remove for student-optimal legal assignment
Require: (G(A ∪B,E), <,q)
1: Let G0 = G.
2: Find the student-optimal stable assignment M0 of (G
0, <,q).
3: Set i = 0 and set DB0 to be the rotation digraph of M0 in (G
0, <,q).
4: while DBi still has an arc do
5: Find (i) a cycle Ci of DBi or (ii) arcs (b
′, a) and (a, b) ∈ A(DBi) where b is a sink in DBi .
6: if (i) is found then
7: Let ρi be the corresponding school-rotation. Set Mi+1 = Mi/ρ
i, and Gi+1 = Gi.
8: else if (ii) is found then
9: Define Gi+1 from Gi by removing ab′ and set Mi+1 = Mi.
10: end if
11: Set i = i+ 1, and set DBi to be the rotation digraph of Mi in (G
i, <,q).
12: end while
13: Output Mi.
a3
a6
a1 a5 a2 a4
Now, we have a case (i), with the corresponding student-rotation ρ1 = b2, a1, b1, a3. Eliminating ρ
1
from M1, we have M2 = M1/ρ
1 = {a1b1, a2b2, a3b2, a4b1, a5b3, a6b3}. In the next iteration, the rotation
digraph DA2 only contains sinks. Thus, the algorithm terminates and output M2 as the school-optimal legal
assignment.
Reverse rotate-remove. The first student on b1’s preference list that prefers b1 to his assigned school
under M0 is a2. Thus, sM0(b1) = a2 and nextM0(b1) = b2. After working out sM0(·) and nextM0(·) of all
the schools, we have the rotation digraph DB0 for the first iteration:
b3 a3 b1 a2 b2
Here, we find a case (ii) with b′ = b1, a = a2 and b = b2. So we set M1 = M0, remove ab′ = a2b1 from
the instance, and update the rotation digraph DB1 for the next iteration:
b3 a3 b1
a6
b2
Now, we have a case (i), with the corresponding school-rotation ρ1 = a6, b3, a3, b1. Eliminating ρ
1
from M1, we have M2 = M1/ρ
1 = {a1b2, a2b2, a3b3, a4b1, a5b3, a6b1}. In the next iteration, the rotation
digraph DB2 only contains sinks. Thus, the algorithm terminates and output M2 as the student-optimal
legal assignment. ♦
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5.2 Correctness of the Algorithms
Theorem 5.5. Algorithm 1 (resp. Algorithm 2) finds the school-optimal (resp. student-optimal) legal as-
signment.
Proof. We focus on the statement for Algorithm 2, the other follows analogously. We first show, by
induction on the iteration i of the algorithm, that Mi ∈ S(Gi, <,q) and L(Gi, <,q) = L. This is obvious
for i = 0. Assume the claim is true for i− 1 ≥ 0 and now consider iteration i. If the condition at Step 6 is
satisfied, then ρi−1 is a school-rotation exposed in Mi−1, and Mi = Mi−1/ρi−1 ∈ S(Gi−1, <,q) by induction
and Lemma 4.4. Moreover, since Gi = Gi−1, we have S(Gi, <,q) = S(Gi−1, <,q) and L(Gi, <,q) =
L(Gi−1, <,q) = L. If conversely the condition at Step 8 is satisfied, Mi = Mi−1 is unchanged and the
edge removed from Gi−1 is illegal by Lemma 5.3. Hence, Mi = Mi−1 ∈ S(Gi−1, <,q) ⊆ S(Gi, <,q) and
L(Gi, <,q) = L(Gi−1, <,q) = L by induction and Lemma 5.2.
In order to conclude the proof, observe that, at the end of the algorithm, the rotation digraph DB∗ only
has sinks. We claim that the assignment output – call it M∗ – is Pareto efficient for the students in the
final instance (G∗, <,q), that is, there is no other assignment in (G∗, <,q), legal or not, that dominates it.
Assume by contradiction that there is M ∈M(G∗,q) such that M M∗. Since all students (weakly) prefer
M to M∗, there is a student a such that b := M(a) >a M∗(a). Then sM∗(b) exists, contradicting the fact
that b is a sink in DB∗ (it is possible that sM∗(b) 6= a, as there may be other nodes that precede a in b’s list
and have the required property, but it is a contradiction regardless). Since we know that legal assignments
form a lattice with respect to the partial order given by , M∗ is the student-optimal legal assignment. 
Note that the previous theorem in particular implies that the output of Algorithm 2 (resp. Algorithm 1)
is unique, regardless of how we choose between Step 6 and Step 8 at each iteration, when multiple possibilities
are present.
5.3 Time Complexity
In this section, we show how to implement Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 so as to run in time O(|E|). We
start by observing that the Gale-Shapley algorithm for stable assignment problems can be implemented as
to run with the same asymptotic time complexity as the one for stable marriage problems. This does not
follow from the mapping pi defined in Section 2, which may increase the number of vertices and edges by a
factor of |V |. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 5.6. The Gale-Shapley algorithm with students or schools proposing can be implemented to run in
time O(|E|).
Note that reverse-remove and reverse rotate-remove algorithms seem to require the complete ro-
tation digraphs at each step. However, this is too expensive to obtain and forbids us from achieving the
same time complexity bound as in Lemma 5.6. Instead, in our implementation, we will only locally build
and update the rotation digraph until a cycle or an illegal edge is found.
In Example 5.8, we show what to maintain and update throughout the iterations of Algorithm 2 for
fast implementation. Those for Algorithm 1 follow analogously. Full details, including correctness and time
complexity analysis, can be found in the proof of Theorem 5.7 included in the appendix. We remark here
that our implementation only requires simple data structures, such as arrays and linked lists.
Theorem 5.7. Algorithm 1 and 2 can be implemented as to run in time O(|E|).
Example 5.8. Consider the following instance with 5 students and 5 schools, where each school has quota
1. The student-optimal stable assignment is M0 = {a1b4, a2b3, a3b2, a4b1, a5b5}, denoted succinctly by
(4, 3, 2, 1, 5) (ordered list of school to which each student is matched).
a1 : b1 > b2 > b3 > b4 > b5 b1 : a4 > a5 > a3 > a2 > a1
a2 : b2 > b1 > b4 > b3 > b5 b2 : a3 > a5 > a4 > a1 > a2
a3 : b3 > b4 > b1 > b2 > b5 b3 : a2 > a5 > a1 > a4 > a3
a4 : b4 > b3 > b2 > b1 > b5 b4 : a1 > a5 > a2 > a3 > a4
a5 : b4 > b3 > b2 > b1 > b5 b5 : a5 > a1 > a2 > a3 > a4
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For the fast implementation of reverse rotate-remove, at each iteration i, together with Mi, we will
additionally keep:
(i) a partial list T i of sinks of DBi , stored as a 0/1 Boolean array of dimension |B|, together with a
position f such that bf is the first school that is not in T
i;
(ii) a chain P i of DBi , stored as a doubly-linked list, together with a Boolean array W
i recording whether
a school b is in P i;
(iii) for each b ∈ B, a position pb with the following property: in determining sMi(b), one does not need to
check if b >a Mi(a) for all a ≥b b(pb), where b(pb) is the student at position pb on b’s preference list.
In Table 1, we outline the updates occurred at all steps (denoted by j) of all iterations (denoted by i)
during the fast execution of reverse rotate-remove. A cell is left blank if no update happens. The steps of
iteration i illustrate the steps in extending the chain P i. W i can be easily deduced from P i and is therefore
not included in the table.
(i.j) P i {pb}b∈B Mi T i f
(0.0) ∅ → b1 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1] (4, 3, 2, 1, 5) ∅ 1
(0.1) b1, a5, b5 [2, 1, 1, 1, 1]
(1.0) b1 [2, 1, 1, 1, 6] b5
(1.1) b1, a3, b2 [3, 1, 1, 1, 6]
(1.2) b1, a3, b2, a5, b5 [3, 2, 1, 1, 6]
(2.0) b1, a3, b2
(2.1) b1, a3, b2, a4, (b1) [3, 3, 1, 1, 6]
(3.0) ∅ → b1 (4, 3, 1, 2, 5)
(3.1-2) b1, a2, b3, a5, b5 [4, 3, 2, 1, 6]
(4.0) b1, a2, b3
(4.1-2) b1, a2, b3, a1, b4, a5, b5 [4, 3, 3, 2, 6]
(5.0) b1, a2, b3, a1, b4
(5.1) b1, a2, b3, a1, b4, (a2) [4, 3, 3, 3, 6]
(6.0) b1 [3, 3, 3, 3, 6] (3, 4, 1, 2, 5)
(6.1-2) b1, a2, b4, a3, (b1) [4, 3, 3, 4, 6]
(7.0) ∅ → b1 (3, 1, 4, 2, 5)
(7.1-3) b1, a1, b3, a4, b2, (a1) [5, 4, 4, 4, 6]
(8.0) b1 [4, 4, 4, 4, 6] (2, 1, 4, 3, 5)
(8.1-2) b1, a1, b2, a2, (b1) [5, 5, 4, 4, 6]
(9.0) ∅ → b1 (1, 2, 4, 3, 5)
(10.0) ∅ → b2 [6, 5, 4, 4, 6] b1, b5 2
(11.0) ∅ → b3 [6, 6, 4, 4, 6] b1, b2, b5 3
(11.1-2) b3, a3, b4, a4, (b3) [6, 6, 5, 5, 6]
(12.0) ∅ → b3 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
(13.0) ∅ → b4 [6, 6, 6, 5, 6] b1, b2, b3, b5 4
(14.0) ∅ [6, 6, 6, 6, 6] b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 ∞
Table 1: Iterations of reverse rotate-remove of Example 5.8.
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When extending the chain P i, if P i = ∅, as in (0.0) and (10.0), we add the first school not in T i to
the chain, which is achieved by repeatedly checking if bf ∈ T i and while so, update f := f + 1. If P i is
non-empty with b at the tail, we rely on pb to find sMi(b). That is, we repeatedly update pb := pb + 1 until
either pb > 5 or a := b(pb) satisfies b >a Mi(a). So pb strictly increases every time an extension happens
with b at the tail. The only time that pb will decrease is when b points to a directed cycle, as the school
b1 in (5.1) and (7.3). In such case, pb is decremented by 1 after the rotation elimination, as seen in (6.0)
and (8.0). This is because it is possible to have sMi+1(b) = sMi(b). There are two scenarios, corresponding
to Step 8 and Step 6 in Algorithm 2, where we stop extending the chain P i: one is when the tail b is a
sink, implied by having pb > 5; the other is when the additional node is already in the chain, which can be
checked against Wi. In the latter case, such nodes are written as (node) in Table 1. ♦
6 An O(|E|) Algorithm for Computing GL
We miss one more ingredient before showing how to build graph GL efficiently. Throughout the section, we
fix an instance (G,<,q) and abbreviate M := M(G,q), S := S(G,<,q), and L := L(G,<,q). We start
with a preliminary fact.
Lemma 6.1. Let e be an illegal edge of (G,<,q), and G˜ = G[E(G) \ {e}]. Then R(G,<,q) ⊆ R(G˜, <,q)
and SR(G,<,q) ⊆ SR(G˜, <,q).
Proof. Fix M ∈ S. Since S ⊆ S(G˜, <,q), M is also a stable assignment of (G˜, <,q). First consider
any student-rotation ρ ∈ R(G,<,q) exposed in M . We want to show that ρ is also exposed at M in
(G˜, <,q). Assume ρ = b0, a0, b1, a1, · · · , br−1, ar−1. By Lemma 4.3, we deduce aibi+1, ai+1bi+1 ∈ E(G˜) for
all i = 0, 1, · · · , r− 1. Hence, bi+1 = sM (ai) and nextM (ai) = ai+1 hold true in G˜ as well. We conclude that
ρ ∈ R(G˜, <,q). A similar argument shows SR(G,<,q) ⊆ SR(G˜, <,q). 
Theorem 6.2. Given an instance of the stable assignment problem (G(V,E), <,q), GL can be found in time
O(|E|), where GL is the subgraph as defined in Theorem 3.1.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 4.3, E(GL) is given by edges in M
L
0 , plus all pairs aibi+1 for
some student-rotation ρ = b0, a0, . . . , ak ∈ R(GL, <,q). By Lemma 4.2, there exists exactly one set R1 of
student-rotations whose elimination leads from ML0 to M0; one set R2 leading from M0 to Mz; and one set
R3 leading from Mz to MLz ; and those set are disjoint and their union gives R(GL, <,q). R3 is computed
during the execution of Algorithm 1, hence in time O(|E|) by Theorem 5.7. By Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 4.2,
R2 coincide with the set R(G,<,q), which can be computed in time O(|E|) by classical algorithms, see
e.g. [15]. Algorithm 2 computes in time O(|E|) (again by Theorem 5.7) the set of school-rotations SR1
whose sequential elimination starting from M0 leads to M
L
0 . By Lemma 4.5, we can compute R1 from SR1
in time O(|E|), concluding the proof. 
7 An O(|E|) Algorithm for EADAM with Consent
In this section, we will formally introduce EADAM algorithm. Instead of the original version by Kesten [18],
we focus on a simplified and outcome-equivalent version introduced by Tang and Yu [31]. Then in Section 7.2
we show how to modify our reverse rotate-remove algorithm to accommodate for nonconsenting students.
In Section 7.3 we give a proof that our modification outputs the same assignment as Tang and Yu [31]’s
simplified EADAM algorithm with any given set of consenting students. Together with Theorem 5.7, this
implies the following.
Theorem 7.1. EADAM with consent on a stable assignment instance (G(A∪B,E), <,q) can be implemented
as to run in time O(|E|).
We also compare our algorithm with previous versions of EADAM algorithm through computational
experiments. The theoretical advantage of reverse rotate-remove is reflected by computational results
on random instances presented in Section 7.5.
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7.1 Simplified EADAM
Kesten [18]’s original EADAM algorithm iteratively re-runs Gale-Shapley’s procedure after identifying and
removing the last interruption caused by consenting interrupters. Informally speaking, an interrupter is
a student who, by applying to school b, interrupts a desirable assignment between school b and another
student at no gain to himself. Removing such interruptions is crucial in neutralizing their adverse effects on
the outcome. In this algorithm, Gale-Shapley algorithm is run as a subroutine in rounds: at each round,
every student that is currently unassigned proposes to the next school on his preference list. We refer the
reader to Kesten [18] for details.
Tang and Yu [31] offer a new perspective on Kesten [18]’s algorithm. The key concept is that of under-
demanded schools for an assignment M , i.e. b ∈ B is underdemanded if there is no student a that strictly
prefers b to M(a). Tang and Yu [31] observe that, at the student-optimal stable matching M , student a that
is matched to underdemanded schools is not Pareto improvable. That is, if a matching M ′ Pareto dominates
M , it must be that M(a) = M ′(a).
With this observation, they develop the simplified EADAM algorithm and show that it is output-
equivalent to Kesten [18]’s original mechanism. The algorithm takes as input an instance (G,<,q) and
a list of consenting students. It iteratively re-runs the Gale-Shapley procedure, identifies underdemanded
schools, and fixes their assignments via deletion of edges. If a non-consenting student is matched to an
underdemanded school, more edges are removed from the instance in order to respect students’ priorities. A
precise description is presented in Algorithm 3 and an example is given in Example 7.3. Note that, at each
iteration i, M i is a stable assignment in Gi. The following theorem collects some results from Tang and Yu
[31], demonstrating the transparency of the consenting incentives and properties of the output. Recall that
an assignment is constrained efficient if it does not violate any nonconsenting students’ priorities, but any
other assignment that is weakly preferred by all students does.
Theorem 7.2. Under the simplified EADAM,
1. the assignment of a student does not change whether she consents or not;
2. the assignment output is Pareto efficient when all students consent and is constrained efficient other-
wise;
Example 7.3. Each school in this example has a quota of 1. Their preference lists are given below. All
students are consenting except for a3.
a1 : b1 > b2 > b3 > b4 b1 : a4 > a2 > a1 > a3
a2 : b1 > b2 > b3 > b4 b2 : a2 > a3 > a1 > a4
a3 : b3 > b2 > b4 > b1 b3 : a1 > a4 > a3 > a2
a4 : b3 > b1 > b2 > b4 b4 : a3 > a1 > a2 > a4
In the first round, the student-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm outputs the student-optimal stable
assignment M0 = {a1b3, a2b2, a3b4, a4b1}. b4 is the underdemanded school, so simplified EADAM settles its
assignment to student a3 by removing edges a3b3 and a3b2 from the instance, as in Step 8. However, since
a3 is not consenting, edges b2a1, b2a4, and b3a2 are also to be removed as in Step 10.
The second round of Gale-Shapley outputs the assignment M1 = {a1b3, a2b2, a3b4, a4b1}. b2 is the
underdemanded school and its assigned student a2 is consenting. So simplified EADAM simply fixes their
assignment by removing edge a2b1 from the instance, as in Step 8.
Running Gale-Shapley again on the updated instance, we obtain the assignment M2 = {a1b1, a2b2, a3b4,
a4b3}. All schools are underdemanded and the algorithm terminates.
Note that using tools developed in previous sections, one can show that a2b1 is actually a legal edge and
the resulting assignment is illegal. ♦
7.2 Reverse Rotate-Remove with Consent
In reverse rotate-remove, the key idea is to reroute arcs that point to students who are assigned to sinks
in the rotation digraph. This allows us to identify school-rotations in the underlying legalized instance.
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Algorithm 3 simplified EADAM
Require: (G(A ∪B,E), <,q), consenting students A ⊆ A
1: Let G0 = G and i = 0.
2: repeat
3: Run student-proposing Gale-Shapley on (Gi, <,q) to obtain assignment M i.
4: Identify underdemanded schools Bi and their students Ai := ∪b∈BiM i(b)
5: Set Gi+1 = Gi.
6: for a ∈ Ai do
7: for b ∈ B such that ab ∈ E(Gi+1) and b >a M i(a) do
8: remove edge ab from Gi+1.
9: if a /∈ A then
10: remove edge a′b from Gi+1 for all a′ ∈ A such that a >b a′ and a′b ∈ E(Gi).
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
14: Set i = i+ 1.
15: until Bi−1 = B
16: Output M i−1.
Assume for instance that (b′, a), (a, b) ∈ A(DB), and b is a sink. Upon such rerouting, a’s priority might be
violated. In particular, if b′ successfully participates in a school-rotation, then ab′ will be a blocking pair for
the new assignment. Hence, if a is not consenting, we can no longer freely reroute the arc. In fact, in order
to respect a’s priority (i.e., to avoid ab′ becoming a blocking pair), b′ cannot be assigned to any student
a′ such that a >b′ a′. This means that the arc coming out of b′ cannot be rerouted to any other student,
essentially marking b′ a sink.
A detailed description of our algorithm is presented in Algorithm 4. As in Algorithm 2, when both case
(i) and (ii) are present at Step 5 of some iteration, we are free to choose between Step 6 and Step 8. These
choices do not affect the final assignment output, as shown in Lemma 7.5. A fast implementation is provided
later in Section 7.4. A step-by-step application of our algorithm on the instance given in Example 7.3 is
outlined in Example 7.4.
Example 7.4. Consider the instance given in Example 7.3, from the student-optimal stable assignment
{a1b3, a2b2, a3b4, a4b1}, we can construct the rotation digraph:
b3 a4 b1 a2 b2 a3 b4
Since b4 is a sink, we will remove edge a3b2 as in Step 9, in the hope of rerouting the arc coming out of
b2. However, because a3 is not consenting, we have to additionally remove edges a1b2 and a4b2 as in Step 11.
This completely removes the possibilities of rerouting, essentially marking b2 a sink, as seen in the rotation
digraph of the updated instance:
b3 a4 b1 a2 b2 b4
Now, b2 is a sink. Since its assigned student a2 is consenting, the algorithm simply removes edge a2b1 in
Step 9, resulting in the following updated rotation digraph:
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Algorithm 4 reverse rotate-remove with consent
Require: (G(A ∪B,E), <,q), consenting students A ⊆ A
1: Let G0 = G.
2: Find the student-optimal stable assignment M0 of (G
0, <,q).
3: Set i = 0 and set DB0 to be the rotation digraph of M0 in (G
0, <,q).
4: while DBi still has an arc do
5: Find (i) a cycle Ci of DBi or (ii) arcs (b
′, a) and (a, b) ∈ A(DBi) where b is a sink in DBi .
6: if (i) is found then
7: Let ρi be the corresponding school-rotation. Set Mi+1 = Mi/ρ
i, and Gi+1 = Gi.
8: else if (ii) is found then
9: Define Gi+1 from Gi by removing ab′, and set Mi+1 = Mi.
10: if a /∈ A then
11: Remove from Gi+1 edges a′b′ for all a′ such that a >b′ a′.
12: end if
13: end if
14: Set i = i+ 1, and set DBi to be the rotation digraph of Mi in (G
i, <,q).
15: end while
16: Output Mi.
b3 a4 b1
a1
b2 b4
Now, we can eliminate the school-rotation (i.e. trading schools between a1 and a4), and update the as-
signment to be {a1b1, a2b2, a3b4, a4b3}. After the assignment update, the new rotation digraph only contains
sinks, and thus the algorithm terminates. This final assignment coincides with the assignment output from
the simplified EADAM algorithm. ♦
It is straightforward to see, from our rotation-based algorithm, that there is a clear separation between
the consenting student and the students participating in a Pareto-improvement cycle. This confirms the
result in Therem 7.2, part 1 that students have no incentive not to consent.
Lemma 7.5. The output of Algorithm 4 for a given instance of the stable assignment problem is unique.
Proof. Note that the execution of Algorithm 4 is not univocally determined since, when both case (i)
and case (ii) apply in Step 5 of some iteration, we are free to choose whether to enter the if clause at Step 6
or the else clause at Step 8, to enter. Let E be all possible executions of the algorithm. We want to show
the outputs of any two executions coincide. We call iteration i the i-th repetition of the while loop from
Step 4. Hence, in iteration i, the algorithm takes from the previous iteration graph Gi−1, assignment Mi−1
with rotation digraph DBi−1 , and creates G
i, Mi and DBi .
Assume by contradiction that there are two executions E1, E2 ∈ E that output two distinct assignments
M1 and M2. Also assume that among all executions that output M1 and M2, E1 and E2 are the ones that
have the most number of initial iterations in common, where we identify an iteration by the edges removed
or the rotation eliminated. That is, E1 and E2 coincide in the first i − 1 iterations, and start to diverge at
iteration i; and i is the latest possible iteration to diverge so that E1 and E2 output two distinct assignments.
For j ∈ N, let M1j (resp. M2j ) and D1Bj (resp. D2Bj ) be the assignment and rotation digraph created at
iteration j of E1 (resp. E2). Now consider the following cases.
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Assume at iteration i of execution E1, a rotation ρ, corresponding to a directed cycle C ⊆ D1Bi−1 , is
eliminated from M1i−1. Since E1 and E2 are identical up to iteration i − 1, we also have C ⊆ D2Bi−1 . Now
in execution E2, cycle C remains in D2Bj for all j ≥ i until ρ is eliminated. This is because for all j ≥ i,
we have sM2i−1(b) = sM2j (b) for all b ∈ C. Moreover, the termination criterion of the algorithm implies that
there must be an iteration k of E2 where ρ is eliminated. Now consider any iteration j ∈ [i, k) of E2. If an
edge a′b′ is removed, we claim that b′ /∈ C; and if a rotation corresponding to cycle Cj is eliminated, we
claim that V (Cj)∩V (C) = ∅. Both claims follow from the fact that every node b ∈ B has outdegree at most
1 in D2Bj . Let I
j denote the jth iteration of E2. Then there is an execution E ′2 ∈ E which has iterations in
order (I1, · · · , Ii−1, Ik, Ii, · · · , Ik−1, Ik+1, · · · ) that outputs M2 but shares more initial iterations with E1, a
contradiction.
Assume (b′, a), (a, b) ∈ D1Bi−1 , where b is a sink, and E1 enters Step 8 at iteration i. With the same
reasoning, in execution E2, we have (b′, a), (a, b) ∈ D2Bi−1 with b being a sink. Moreover, (b′, a), (a, b) ∈ D2Bj
for all iteration j ∈ [i, k], where k is the iteration of E2 during which ab′ is removed from the instance. Again,
because every node b ∈ B has outdegree at most 1 in D2Bj , at any iteration j ∈ [i, k), if an edge ab is removed,
we must have b 6= b′; and if a rotation corresponding to cycle Cj is eliminated, we must have b′ /∈ V (Cj).
Thus, as in the previous case, we can construct another execution E ′2 ∈ E from E2 by bringing iteration k
before iteration i such that E ′2 outputs M2 but shares more common iterations with E1, a contradiction.
Since there are only two possibilities for iteration i of E1 and we have ruled out both cases, it is impossible
to have E1 and E2 that output different assignments. 
7.3 Equivalence between Reverse Rotate-remove with Consent and Simplified EADAM
The following lemmas show an interesting connection between underdemanded schools and sinks in rotation
digraphs.
Lemma 7.6. Consider the school-rotation digraph DB associated with instance (G,<,q) at a stable assign-
ment M . b is a sink in DB if and only if it is an underdemanded school at M .
Proof. Let a be b’s least preferred student among M(b). b is a sink implies that for all students a′ such
that a >b a
′, we have M(a′) >a′ b. On the other hand, stability of M implies that for all a′ such that a′ >b a
and a′ /∈ M(b), we have M(a′) >a′ b. These two cases conclude the proof for the “only if” direction. The
other is clear from the construction of the rotation digraph. 
Lemma 7.7. In Algorithm 4, if b is a sink in DBi , it remains a sink in DBj for all j ≥ i. Moreover, if
a ∈Mi(b), Mi(a) = Mj(a) for all j ≥ i.
Proof. The first part follows from the observation that Mj  Mi for all iterations j ≥ i. For any
a ∈ Mi(b), since b is a sink in DBj for all j ≥ i, (a, b) is not part of a directed cycle of DBj for any j ≥ i.
Thus, the assignment of a remains for all iterations j ≥ i. 
The following theorem, together with Lemma 7.5, can be used to prove that Algorithm 4 is outcome-
equivalent to the simplified EADAM, and hence outcome-equivalent to Kesten’s original EADAM itself. As
shown in Example 7.3, the output may not be legal, hence we cannot rely on the structure or legal matchings
here. The full proof can be found in the appendix. Here we sketch the main arguments.
Because of Lemma 7.5, it is sufficient to show that a certain sequence of iterations of reverse rotate-remove
with consent leads to an output that is the same as the one from simplified EADAM. The particular se-
quence is as follows. In the initial iterations, we may eliminate any rotation that is found in the rotation
digraph, but we can only enter the else clause in Step 8 if the sink b, described in case (ii) of Step 5, is a sink
in D0. Assume iteration j1 ends with D
j1 that has no cycles, and none of its sinks with positive indegree is
a sink in D0. Similarly, in the next set of iterations, we can only enter the else clause if the sink b in case
(ii) is a sink in Dj1 . Define j2, j3, ... analogously. The proof is then concluded by showing that for all i ≥ 1,
Mji = M
i.
Theorem 7.8. The outputs of Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 3 coincide.
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7.4 Fast Implementation of Reverse Rotate-Remove with Consent
The fast implementation is heavily based on the implementation presented in Section 5.3. Therefore, we
deferred its proof of Lemma 7.10 to the appendix, but demonstrate it in Example 7.9.
Example 7.9. Consider the instance in Example 5.8. Assume a5 is not consenting. In Table 2, we outline
the updates, similar to those in Example 5.8. When school b points to the nonconsenting student a5 (whose
partner b5 is a sink) in the rotation digraph, in addition to remove a5 and b5 from the chain P
i, we also
remove b from P i, set T i := T i ∪ {b}, and update pb := 6 in lieu of the edge removals in Step 11. Such
updates can be seen in (1.0), (2.0), (3.0), and (4.0). ♦
(i.j) P i {pb}b∈B Mi T i f
(0.0) ∅ → b1 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1] (4, 3, 2, 1, 5) ∅ 1
(0.1) b1, a5, b5 [2, 1, 1, 1, 1]
(1.0) ∅ → b2 [6, 1, 1, 1, 6] b1, b5 2
(1.1) b2, a5, b5 [6, 2, 1, 1, 6]
(2.0) ∅ → b3 [6, 6, 1, 1, 6] b1, b2, b5 3
(2.1) b3, a5, b5 [6, 6, 2, 1, 6]
(3.0) ∅ → b4 [6, 6, 6, 1, 6] b1, b2, b3, b5 4
(3.1) b4, a5, b5 [6, 6, 6, 2, 6]
(4.0) ∅ [6, 6, 6, 6, 6] b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 ∞
Table 2: Iterations of reverse rotate-remove of Example 7.9
Lemma 7.10. Algorithm 4 can be implemented as to run in time O(|E|).
Proof of Theorem 7.1. It follows immediately from Theorem 7.8 and Lemma 7.10. 
7.5 Computational Experiments
Since Gale-Shapley’s algorithm on stable assignment instances can be implemented to run in time O(|E|) by
Lemma 5.6, the original EADAM runs in time O(|E|2), and the simplified EADAM runs in time O(|E||V |).
This is because both algorithm run Gale-Shapley’s routine iteratively, and the original EADAM repeats the
routine for at most |E| times, whereas the simplified EADAM repeats the routine for at most |V | times.
We remark that although mechanism design, rather than computational complexity, is the primiary interest
of Kesten’s paper, computation efficiency is nevertheless crucial in putting the mechanism into practice,
especially for large markets such as the New York school system. In fact, Tang and Yu [31] mention
computational tractability as one of the contributions of their simplified version.
One major advantage of our reverse rotate-remove with consent is that instead of following the
iterative structure of Kesten’s algorithm, we update assignment locally using the structural results (lattice
structure and rotations) of stable assignments. Our algorithm runs in time O(|E|) as shown in Lemma 7.10.
To further demonstrate the computational advantage of our algorithm, we randomly generated instances
of varying sizes, and recorded the running time of all three algorithms. The running time of Gale-Shapley
algorithm is also recorded as a benchmark. The number of students in our instances ranges from 500 to
30, 000, and the corresponding number of schools ranges from 5 to 300. For each instance size, 100 instances
(G,<,q) are obtained by randomly generating G, <, and q. The quota of each schools is randomly selected
between 50 and 150 uniformly. We tested scenarios where each student’s chance of consenting is 10%, 30%,
50%, 80%, and 100%. The experiments were carried out on a computing node with 1 core and 4GB RAM.
A visual representation of the running times of different algorithms can be found in Figure 1. The
shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals of each algorithm for given instance sizes. Our algorithms perform
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significantly faster than the simplified EADAM [31] and dramatically faster than the original EADAM [18],
with the differences being especially pronounced when all students consent.
The New York City school district has approximately 90, 000 students applying to 700 public high school
programs every year, where students can list up to 12 schools in their application [25]. We further conducted
computational experiments whose instance size are similar to the those of New York City. With similar
setups, we test our algorithm against simplified EADAM on randomly generated instances. Results of our
experiments are summarized in Figure 2. The difference in computational time is noticeably different with
all levels of consenting percentages. In particular, when all students consent, reverse rotate-remove takes
approximately 3 minutes, whereas simplified EADAM takes on average 4 hours and its run time has a high
variance.
8 Latin and Legal Marriages
An n × n matrix is a Latin square if each row and each column is a permutation of numbers 1, 2, · · · , n.
Given an instance (G,<) of the stable marriage problem with complete lists, we call the position of a in the
preference list of b the rank of a in b’s list. Following the work of Benjamin et al. [6], we say an instance
(G,<) with |A| = |B| = n is Latin if there exists a Latin square Q with n rows indexed by elements of A
and n columns indexed by elements of B such that, for each row a and column b, Q(a, b) is the rank of b
in a’s list, and n + 1 − Q(a, b) is the rank of a in b’s list. We call such Q the Latin ranking matrix. See
Example 8.6 for an example of a Latin ranking matrix and its associated stable marriage instance. In this
section, we prove the following.
Theorem 8.1. Let (G,<) be a Latin instance. Then GL = G. Moreover, let (G,<) have n men and n
women. Then there exists an instance (G′, <′) with n + 1 men and n + 1 women such that |S(G′, <′)| = 1
and L(G′, <′) = {M ∪ a˜b˜ : M ∈ S(G,<)}, where a˜ and b˜ are the additional (n+ 1)th man and woman.
Benjamin et al. [6] provide, for each n that is a power of 2, a Latin instance (G,<) with |S(G,<)| = ω(2n).
Hence, there are instances (G′, <′) with n men and n women such that |S(G′, <′)| = 1 and |L(G′, <′)| > 2n.
Up to a different constant in the basis, the asymptotic ratio between the quantities |L(G,<)| and |S(G,<)|
cannot be increased, as it has been recently shown that there exists a constant c > 1 such that each instance
of the stable marriage problem with n men and women has O(cn) stable matchings [17]. We believe that
future investigations of the relationship between Latin instances and legal matchings may provide further
advancement on the question of Knuth [20].
The theorem below [6] gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a matching to be stable in a Latin
instance.
Theorem 8.2. Let M be a matching on Latin ranking matrix Q. M is stable if and only if there do not exist
row a and column b such that Q(M(b), b) > Q(a, b) > Q(a,M(a)) or Q(M(b), b) < Q(a, b) < Q(a,M(a)).
The following lemma shows that in a Latin instance, the set of legal matchings is exactly the set of stable
matchings.
Lemma 8.3. Let (G,<) be a Latin instance. Then GL = G.
Proof. LetM i = {ab : Q(a, b) = i}, where Q is the Latin ranking matrix of the instance. M i is a matching
by properties of Latin squares. By construction, for any row a and column b, Q(M i(b), b) = i = Q(a,M i(a))
and thus M i must be stable by Theorem 8.2. Since ∪i∈[n]M i = E(G), by Theorem 3.1, GL = G. 
As we show next, the set of stable matchings of a Latin instance can be “masked” into the set of legal
matchings of an auxiliary instance with only one more man and woman, such that the auxiliary instance has
only one stable matching. The construction is as follows: given a Latin instance (G(A∪B,E), <), construct
an auxiliary instance (G′(A′∪B′, E′), <′), where A′ = A∪{a˜}, B′ = B∪{b˜}, E′ = A′×B′, and <′ is defined
as follows:
(i) every a ∈ A ranks b˜ in the last position, and <′a restricted to B is exactly <a.
(ii) a˜ can have arbitrary rankings of B′ as long as b˜ is the least preferred.
21
(iii) every b ∈ B ranks a˜ in the second place, and <′b restricted to A is exactly <b.
(iv) b˜ can also have arbitrary rankings of A′ as long as a˜ is ranked the first.
We first show the following facts before concluding the proof of Theorem 8.1.
Lemma 8.4. Given a Latin instance (G,<), define (G′, <′) as above. |S(G′, <′)| = 1.
Proof. Let M ∈ S(G′, <′). We will first show M (˜b) = a˜. Assume by contradiction that M (˜b) = a for
some a ∈ A. Let b be a’s least preferred partner in B. Then b >′a b˜ = M(a) by construction. By the
symmetric nature of Latin instances, a must be b’s most preferred partner in A, which means a >′b M(b).
But then ab is a blocking pair of M , contradicting stability. Next, we want to show every woman in A is
matched to her most preferred man. Assume by contradiction that the claim is not true for some b ∈ B.
Then a˜ >′b M(b). Since b >
′
a˜ b˜ by construction, a˜b blocks M , which again contradicts stability. Hence,
S(G′, <′) contains exactly one stable matching, namely the one where every woman is matched to her most
preferred man according to <′. 
Lemma 8.5. Let (G,<) and (G′, <′) be as before. L(G′, <′) = {M ∪ a˜b˜ : M ∈ S(G,<)}
Proof. Let M0 be the only stable matching of (G
′, <′). Since every woman in A′ is matched to her most
preferred man in B′ as shown in the proof of Lemma 8.4, M0 is also the woman-optimal legal matching of
L(G′, <′). In addition, since b˜ is the least preferred woman of every man by construction of G′, b˜ is a sink
in the rotation digraph of M0 and remains a sink during the execution of Algorithm 2. Thus, a˜ is matched
b˜ in the man-optimal legal matching of L(G′, <′). Thus, a˜b˜ ∈ M for all M ∈ L(G′, <′), and according to
Theorem 3.1, all edges in E′ := {ab˜ : a ∈ A}∪{a˜b : b ∈ B} are illegal edges. By Lemma 5.2, we have L(G′, <′
) = L(G[E \ E′], <′) = {M ∪ a˜b˜ : M ∈ L(G,<)}, where the last equality is because E \ E′ = E(G) ∪ {a˜b˜}.
Finally, by Lemma 8.3, we have L(G,<) = S(G,<) and thus, L(G′, <′) = {M ∪ a˜b˜ : M ∈ S(G,<)}. 
Example 8.6. Consider the following Latin ranking matrix Q and the associated instance.
b1 b2 b3 b4

a1 1 2 3 4
a2 2 1 4 3
a3 3 4 1 2
a4 4 3 2 1
a1 : b1 > b2 > b3 > b4 b1 : a4 > a3 > a2 > a1
a2 : b2 > b1 > b4 > b3 b2 : a3 > a4 > a1 > a2
a3 : b3 > b4 > b1 > b2 b3 : a2 > a1 > a4 > a3
a4 : b4 > b3 > b2 > b1 b4 : a1 > a2 > a3 > a4
Let M = {a1b1, a2b3, a3b2, a4b4} be the matching corresponding to the cells boxed in the Latin ranking
matrix. M is unstable, since a3b1 is a blocking pair. Equivalently, we can apply Theorem 8.2 on the Latin
ranking matrix. Consider a = a3, b = b1, we have Q(M(b), b) = 1 < Q(a, b) = 3 < Q(a,M(a)) = 4, also
implying that M is unstable.
(G,<) has 10 stable matchings. Now consider the auxiliary instance (G′, <′), whose preference lists are
given in Example 5.8. (G′, <′) has only one stable matching, which is {a1b4, a2b3, a3b2, a4b1, a˜b˜}, but its
legalized instance (G′L, <
′
L) has 10 stable matchings. ♦
Lemmas 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5 immediately imply Theorem 8.1.
Acknowledgments. We thank Yiannis Mourtos and Jay Sethuraman for useful suggestions on an earlier
version of this draft.
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Figure 1: Comparing EADAM, simplified EADAM, and reverse rotate-remove with consent
in one-to-many setting, where schools have an average of 100 seats. Average run time of sim-
plified EADAM and reverse rotate-remove with consent included for largest instance in our
experiment.
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Figure 2: Comparing simplified EADAM (sEADAM) and reverse rotate-remove with consent
(RRR) in random instances whose sizes are similar to those of the New York City school system.
Run time of Gale-Shapley (GS) included as a benchmark. Each line represents one instance.
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A Rotations
A.1 Basic Results for Stable Marriages
Throughout this section, fix a stable marriage instance (G,<) with G = G(A∪B,E) and writeM :=M(G),
S := S(G,<). If ab ∈M for some M ∈ S, we say that a is a stable partner of b, and that ab is a stable edge
or stable pair.
Both the definition of dominance relation between matchings and Theorem 4.1 immediately specialize
to the marriage case, as well as student-rotations and school-rotations. Moreover, those concepts coincide
with classical ones, see e.g. [15]. In particular, we call the school-rotations woman-rotations and student-
rotations just rotations. Because of the symmetric nature of men and women in stable marriage problems, a
woman-rotation is a rotation in the instance obtained from (G,<) by switching the sets of men and women.
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Part 1,2,3 of next theorem collect results that can be found in e.g. Gusfield and Irving [15]. They are stated
in terms of rotations, but immediately extend to woman-rotations. Part 4 is immediate by the symmetric
role of rotations and woman-rotations.
Theorem A.1. Consider an instance (G(A ∪B,E), <) of the stable marriage problem.
1. Let M ∈ S. If M 6= Mz, there is at least one rotation ρ exposed in M , and so let M ′ = M/ρ. Then,
M ′ ∈ S and M M ′.
2. Every stable matching can be generated by a sequence of rotation eliminations, starting from M0, and
every such sequence contains the same rotations.
3. For any a ∈ A and b ∈ B, there is at most one rotation ρ = b0, a0, b1, . . . , br−1, ar−1 such that a = ai
and b = bi for some i ∈ N, and at most one rotation such that a = ai and b = bi+1 (indices are taken
modulo r).
4. There exists a bijection f between rotations and woman-rotations with the following properties: if ρ is a
rotation exposed in M ∈ S, then f(ρ) is a woman-rotation exposed in M/ρ ∈ S, and (M/ρ)/f(ρ) = M ;
if ρ′ is a woman-rotation exposed in M ∈ S, then f−1(ρ′) is a rotation exposed in M/ρ′ ∈ S, and
(M/ρ′)/f−1(ρ′) = M .
A.2 Extension to Stable Assignments and Proofs of Lemmas 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5
Recall that map pi induces a bijection between S(G,<,q) and S(HG, <G) and that we useMH to denote pi(M)
for M ∈M(G,q). Moreover, this bijection is known to be dominance-preserving, i.e. for M,M ′ ∈ S(G,<,q),
we have MH M ′H if and only if M M ′. Next lemma shows that rotations associated to stable matchings
in (HG, <G) have a very structured manner of moving students from/to seats of schools. See Figure 3 for a
visual representation.
Lemma A.2. Let MH ∈ S(HG, <G).
1) Let a ∈ A such that MH(a) = bi for some b ∈ B and i ∈ [qb − 1]. Then sMH (a) = bi+1.
2) Let ρ be a rotation exposed in MH , and M
′
H = MH/ρ. Then, for each b ∈ B, there exists an
index i ∈ [qb + 1] such that MH(bj) = M ′H(bj) for all j ∈ [i − 1], and MH(bj) = M ′H(bj+1) for all
j = i, · · · , qb − 1.
Proof. By construction, bi+1 is the seat immediately after bi on a’s preference list and by definition of
mapping pi, we know a >bi+1 MH(b
i+1). This proves part 1). For part 2), if no seats of b are in rotation ρ,
then i = qb + 1 is the required index. Hence, assume b
j ∈ ρ for some j ∈ [qb], and let i be minimum index
with this property. Then MH(b
j) = M ′H(b
j) for all j ∈ [i − 1] by the choice of i. Moreover, by part 1), we
have that ai := MH(b
i) 6= ∅ is matched to bi+1 in M ′H . Hence, bi+1 ∈ ρ. Similarly, ai+1 := MH(bi+1) 6= ∅ is
matched to bi+2 in M ′H . Hence we can iterate and conclude that aj := MH(b
j) 6= ∅ is matched to bj+1 in
M ′H for all j = i, · · · , qb − 1. 
Lemma A.3. There exists a bijection µ between student-rotations in (G,<,q) and rotations in (HG, <G)
such that ρ is a rotation exposed in MH ∈ S(HG, <G) if and only if µ(ρ) is exposed in M ∈ S(G,<,q).
Moreover, in such case we have (M/µ(ρ))H = MH/ρ.
Proof. We first define µ and show that, for a rotation ρ in (HG, <G) and MH ∈ S(HG, <G) at which ρ is
exposed, we have that µ(ρ) is a rotation exposed at M and (M/µ(ρ))H = MH/ρ. Fix ρ, MH as above. For
every school b` such that b
j
` ∈ ρ for some j ∈ [qb` ], let a1` , · · · , a
qb`
` be the students assigned to b
1
` , · · · , b
qb`
` in
MH . From Lemma A.2, we know a
j
` 6= ∅ for all j ∈ [qb` ] and sMH (aj`) = bj+1` for all j ∈ [qb` − 1]. Thus, ρ
can be represented as
ρ = bi00 , a
i0
0 , · · · , bqb00 , aqb00 , bi11 , ai11 , · · · , bqb11 , aqb11 , · · · , · · · , bir−1r−1 , air−1r−1 , · · · , b
qbr−1
r−1 , a
qbr−1
r−1 ,
where for each `, i` is the index as in Lemma A.2. Observe that all students participating in the rotation
ρ, except for the ones that are least preferred by their assigned schools, are assigned to different seats of
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the same school in MH and M
′
H := MH/ρ. Thus, µ(ρ) := b0, a
qb0
0 , b1, a
qb1
1 , · · · , · · · , br−1, a
qbr−1
r−1 is a student-
rotation exposed in M and M/µ(ρ) = M ′. Note moreover that µ(ρ) is a function of ρ only, and not of MH .
We now prove that µ is injective, by showing that there do not exist distinct rotations ρ1, ρ2 of (HG, <G)
such that µ(ρ1) = µ(ρ2). Assume such rotations exist and write µ(ρ1) = µ(ρ2) = b, a · · · . Then both ρ1 and
ρ2 rotate a from b
qb , which contradicts Theorem A.1, part 3. Last, assume student-rotation ρ′ is exposed in
M for some M ∈ S(G,<,q). Let ρ′ = b0, aqb00 , b1, aqb11 , · · · , · · · , br−1, a
qbr−1
r−1 . Then, one can check that
ρ0 := b
i0
0 , a
i0
0 , · · · , bqb00 , aqb00 , bi11 , ai11 , · · · , bqb11 , aqb11 , · · · , · · · , bir−1r−1 , air−1r−1 , · · · , b
qbr−1
r−1 , a
qbr−1
r−1
is a rotation exposed in MH and µ(ρ0) = ρ
′, where for all j ∈ [r], ij is the rank of aqbj−1j−1 in M ′′(bj) ∪
{aqbj−1j−1 } by the preference ordering of bj . This shows that µ is surjective – hence a bijection – and the “if”
part of the statement, concluding the proof. 
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Figure 3: Cycle in DA corresponding to a student-rotation µ(ρ) (dashed) and its corresponding
rotation ρ (full) in the reduced instance.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. The first statement follows from Lemma A.3 and Theorem A.1, part 1 immediately.
Now let M0 be the student-optimal stable assignment of (G,<,q). For any stable assignment M 6= M0,
we want to show that M can be generated from M0 through a sequence of student-rotations. Since pi is
stability- and dominance-preserving, M0H is the man-optimal stable matching in (HG, <G), and MH is a
stable matching in (HG, <G). By Theorem A.1, part 2, MH can be generated by a sequence of rotations
from M0H . Assume ρ0, ρ1, · · · , ρk is one of such sequences. That is, MH = M0H/ρ0/ρ1/ · · · /ρk. Then
iteratively applying Lemma A.3, we have M = M0/µ(ρ1)/µ(ρ1)/ · · · /µ(ρk). Hence, µ(ρ1), µ(ρ1), · · · , µ(ρk)
is the sequence of student-rotations desired. Finally, to prove all such sequences contain the same set
of student-rotations, assume by contradiction that there is one sequence ρ′0, ρ
′
1, · · · , ρ′k whose sequential
elimination from M0 leads to M but {ρ′0, ρ′1, · · · , ρ′k} 6= {µ(ρ0), µ(ρ1), · · · , µ(ρk)}. Again we have MH =
M0H/µ
−1(ρ′0)/µ
−1(ρ′1)/ · · · /µ−1(ρ′k) by iteratively applying Lemma A.3. Since µ is a bijection, we must
have {µ−1(ρ′0), µ−1(ρ′1), · · · , µ−1(ρ′k)} 6= {ρ0, ρ1, · · · , ρk}. However, this contradicts Theorem A.1, part 2,
and thus all such sequences must contain the same set of student-rotations. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. We first prove the second half of the lemma. For the “if ” part, if a is assigned to b
in M0, where M0 is the student-optimal stable assignment, then ab is a stable pair by definition. Assume M
is a stable assignment and ρ = b0, a0, b1, a1, · · · , br−1, ar−1 is a student-rotation exposed in M with a = ai,
b = bi+1 for some i. Then, from Lemma A.3, we know M
′ := M/ρ is a stable assignment. Since M ′(a) = b,
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ab is again a stable pair. For the “only if ” part, assume ab is a stable pair. That is, ab ∈ M for some
stable assignment M . Pick M to be maximal w.r.t to the dominance relation , i.e., there is no other stable
assignment M ′ such that M ′  M and M ′(a) = b. If M = M0, we are done. So assume M 6= M0, then by
Lemma 4.2, M can be generated by a sequence of student-rotation eliminations starting from M0. At least
one of those rotations must be ρ = b0, a0, b1, a1, · · · , br−1, ar−1 with a = ai, b = bi+1 for some i, otherwise
M(a) 6= b.
For the first half of the lemma, the “if ” part follows from the definition of student-rotations. For the
“only if ” portion, assume ab is a stable pair and in particular, assume ab ∈ M for some stable assignment
M . Pick M to be minimal one w.r.t to dominance relation . If M is the school-optimal stable assignment,
we are done. So assume it is not. We will show that there must be a student-rotation exposed in M .
Consider the reduced marriage instance (HG, <G). Since MH is not the woman-optimal stable matching in
(HG, <G), by Theorem A.1, part 1, there must be a rotation ρ exposed in MH . By Lemma A.3, µ(ρ) is a
student-rotation exposed in M . Now we want to show that ab is a pair in one of these student-rotations.
Assume by contradiction that ab is not a pair in any student-rotations exposed in M . Let ρ′ be any one of
these student-rotations, then M ′ := M/ρ′ is dominated by M and ab ∈ M ′, contradicting the choice of M .

We now show the school-rotation counterpart of Lemma A.3.
Lemma A.4. There exists a bijection µw between school-rotations in (G,<,q) and woman-rotations in
(HG, <G) such that ρ is a woman-rotation exposed in MH ∈ S(HG, <G) if and only if µw(ρ) is exposed in
M . Moreover, in such case we have (M/µw(ρ))H = MH/ρ.
Proof. We start by defining µw and show that, for a woman-rotation ρ in (HG, <G) and MH ∈ S(HG, <G)
at which ρ is exposed, we have that µw(ρ) is a school-rotation exposed at M and (M/µ(ρ))H = MH/ρ. Fix ρ,
MH as above. We will follow the same notations as in the proof of Lemma A.3. First, we show that for every
seat bj` ∈ ρ with j < qb`, we must have sMH (bj`) = aj+1` , where aj+1` := MH(bj+1` ). Assume by contradiction
that sMH (b
j
`) = a
′ for some other a′. Then we must have a′ >bj` a
j+1
` , b
j
` >a′ M(a
′), and a′ /∈ M(b). This
implies, by construction of (HG, <G), that a
′ >bj+1` a
j+1
` and b
j+1
` >a′ M(a
′), making a′bj+1` a blocking pair
of MH , contradicting stability. Thus, we can write
ρ = ai00 , b
i0
0 , · · · , aqb00 , bqb00 , ai11 , bi11 , · · · , aqb11 , bqb11 , · · · , · · · , air−1r−1 , bir−1r−1 , · · · , a
qbr−1
r−1 , b
qbr−1
r−1
Observe that for a given school, among its assigned students that are in ρ, only the highest ranked one is
assigned to a seat in a different school in M ′H := MH/ρ. Moreover, by the definition of woman-rotations
and school-rotations, we have sMH (b
qb`
` ) = sM (b`) for all ` = 0, 1, · · · , r − 1. Thus,
µw(ρ) := a
i0
0 , b0, a
i1
1 , b1, · · · , · · · , air−1r−1 , br−1
is exposed in M and M/µw(ρ) = M
′. Again, note that µw(ρ) is a function of ρ only and not of MH . To see
that µw is surjective, assume ρ
′ is a school-rotation exposed in an assignment M ′. Then the inverse mapping
µ−1w (ρ
′) follows simply from the construction of µw defined above. Next, we will show µw is injective. Assume
by contradiction that there exists a school-rotation ρ′ = a0, b0, a1, b1, · · · and woman-rotations ρ1 6= ρ2 such
that ρ′ = µw(ρ1) = µw(ρ2). Then both ρ1 and ρ2 moves a1 to b
qb0
0 , contradicting Theorem A.1, part 3.
Thus, µw is a bijection, concluding the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.4 The first part follows from Lemma A.4 and Theorem A.1, part 1. For the second
part, assume that there are no school-rotations exposed in M . That means MH also has no exposed woman-
rotations. By Theorem A.1, part 1, MH must be the man-optimal stable matching in (HG, <G). Moreover,
since pi is dominance preserving, M must be the student-optimal stable assignment. 
Proof of Lemma 4.5. Let M0 and Mz be the student- and school-optimal stable assignments. Consider a
sequence of rotations in (HG, <G) to generate MzH from M0H . By Theorem A.1, part 2, all such sequences
contain the same set of rotations, call it %. By Lemma A.3, ∪ρ∈%µ(ρ) = R(G,<,q). Similarly, there is a
sequence of woman-rotations to generate M0H from MzH , and denote this set of woman-rotations by %
′.
Then by Lemma A.4, ∪ρ∈%′µw(ρ) = SR(G,<,q). Clearly |%| = |%′|, as the role of men and women is
symmetric in marriage problems. By Theorem A.1, part 4, we know there is a bijection between % and %′,
which together with bijection µ in Lemma A.3 and bijection µw in Lemma A.4 concludes the proof. 
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B Details of implementations
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.6
Proof. We consider the case where students propose, the other one following in a similar fashion. Since each
student proposes to each school at most once, there are O(|E|) proposals. In each iteration, we keep a list of
students that have schools remaining on their preference lists, and pick the first of this list at each iteration.
In addition, for each student, we keep a pointer to the last school they proposed to, which gives us faster
access to the school he will propose to next. Since there are O(|E|) rejections, these updates take O(|E|)
time.
Each school b ∈ B maintains three pieces of information throughout the iterations. They are: a Boolean
array `b of size |A| recording its currently assigned students; an integer cb recording the number of students
it is assigned to; and the least preferred student wb it is assigned to. Now consider the iteration where a
proposes to b. If cb < qb, information update is simple and requires constant time. Assume cb = qb where
rejection happens. If wb >b a, there is nothing to update. We are left with the case where a >b wb. In such
case, b rejects wb and accepts a, so the update on `b is straightforward. Since the least preferred student
of each school improves over the course of the algorithm, we may update wb by looking forwards on b’s
preference list, starting from wb, until reaching a student a such that `b(a) = 1. Thus, throughout the
algorithm, all such updates require O(deg(b)) time for each school b. All together, the algorithm runs in
time O(|E|). 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5.7
Proof. We show details for Algorithm 2, as those for Algorithm 1 follow in a similar fashion. For simplicity,
we call “school-rotations” simply “rotations” throughout the proof. We can preprocess the input in time
O(|E|) and assume that: for each node, we have its preference list given as an ordered list; given a ∈ A, b ∈ B
and an assignment M , in constant time we can access M(a) and the least preferred student in M(b); given
x ∈ A ∪B and two neighbors y1 and y2 of x, we can, in constant time, decide if y1 >x y2.
Algorithm 2 first finds the student-optimal stable assignment. This takes time O(|E|) by Lemma 5.6.
Then the algorithm enters the while loop. A key fact we will resort to multiple times in our arguments is
the following: (‡) for any pair of iterations i, j such that i > j, we have Mi Mj . Given an assignment M ,
we say that we scan an edge ab when we check b >a M(a) given the condition M(b) >b a (this is required
to compute sM (b)). From what assumed above, scanning ab requires constant time. We denote by b(i) the
student at the ith position on the preference list of b. Also let deg(b) be the number of neighbors b has in G.
Assume schools are sorted as B = {b1, b2, · · · , b|B|}.
At each iteration i, we keep the assignment Mi as an |A|-dimensional array with the kth position recording
the school the kth student is assigned to; a partial list T i of sinks of DBi , stored as a 0/1 Boolean array of
dimension |B|; a position f such that bf is the first school that is not in T i; a chain P i of DBi , stored as a
doubly-linked list; a Boolean array W i recording whether a school b is in P i; and for each b ∈ B, a position
pb such that, in determining sMi(b), we do not need to scan ab for all a such that a ≥b b(pb). We initialize
M0 = M0, T
0 := ∅, f := 1, P 0 := ∅, W 0 := ∅, and pb to be the position of the least preferred student in
M0(b) on b’s preference list for every b ∈ B. Clearly the initialization takes O(|E|) time.
We start by showing, for each iteration i, how to update the aforementioned pieces of information
through two series of operations: those underlined in the text, which require constant time, and those
::::
wave
:::::::::
underlined. Second, we show the correctness of these updates. Lastly, we bound the running time of the
algorithm by investigating the number of times we repeat each of underlined operations and the total time
needed to perform wave underlined operations.
For each iteration of the while loop, we perform the following updates.
• If P i is empty, we select the first school that is not in T i and add it to P i. This school can be obtained
by checking if bf ∈ T i and, while bf ∈ T i, updating f := f + 1. So we may assume P i is non-empty,
and represented as P i = b0, a1, b1, · · · , ak, bk.
• Within the iteration, we extend P i and simultaneously maintain W i, by finding ak+1 = sMi(bk),
bk+1 = Mi(ak+1), · · · until we reach a node bj such that either (1) bj is a sink (step 8); or (2)
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nextMi(bj) = b` for some ` < j (step 6). In particular,
a) In finding sMi(bk), we repeatedly update pbk := pbk + 1 until pbk > deg(bk) (i.e., bk is a sink and
we are in case (1) above) or by scanning of bk(pbk)bk we deduce sMi(bk) = bk(pbk).
b) If sMi(bk) is found, we check if bk+1 := nextMi(bk) ∈W i. If this happens, we are in case (2) above,
otherwise we set k := k + 1, and go to a).
• In case (1), ajbj−1 is removed fromGi as an illegal edge. We achieve this by setting P i+1 := P i \ {aj , bj},
W i+1 := W i \ {bj}, and we update T i+1 := T i ∪ {bj}.
• In case (2), a school-rotation – corresponding to the directed cycle Ci = b`, · · · , bj , aj+1 – is found
and eliminated, as to
::::::::
construct
:::::
Mi+1:::::from::::Mi. We update pb`−1 := pb`−1 − 1 if ` > 0, and set
::::::::::::::
P i+1 := P i \ Ci,
:::::::::::::::
W i+1 := W i \ Ci.
This shows that storing and updating T i, f, P i,W i, {pb}b∈B , together with Mi, are sufficent for the
execution of the algorithm.
We will now argue about the correctness of these updates. In both cases (1) and (2), P i+1 is a chain
of DBi+1 and W
i+1, Mi+1 are correctly computed. Moreover, because of (‡), sinks of DBi are also sinks
in DBi+1 , justifying the update on T
i and f . Lastly, consider any node b whose associated position pb is
updated in this iteration. There are two scenarios. The first scenario is when looking for sMi(b), where pb
is repeatedly updated until pb > deg(b) or until b(pb) is added to the chain P
i. In either case, because of
(‡) and the fact that every time pb is updated, it is incremented only by 1, the updated pb remains a good
choice for our purpose. The second scenario is when b = b`−1, where pb is updated to be pb− 1. In this case,
we found a rotation ρ with b /∈ ρ and nextMi(b) ∈ ρ. We carry out the decrement because it is possible to
have sMi+1(b) = sMi(b) and thus re-scanning of sMi(b)b is required. No further decrements on pb is needed
again because of (‡).
Finally, we will argue about the time complexity. First note that the number of iterations is clearly
bounded by the number of edges plus the number of rotations, hence by O(|E|). The number of updates on
P i, W i and T i in case (1) is then also O(|E|). Since f only increases, we update f := f + 1 at most O(|V |)
times. The number of times we check if bf ∈ T i is given by the number of positive answers (proportional to the
number of updates of f) plus the number of negative answers (proportional to the number of iterations), hence
O(|E|). The number of times {pb}b∈B , is updated is given by the number of times we update pb := pb + 1
(proportional to the number of edges) plus twice the number of times we update pb := pb − 1 (proportional
to the number of rotations), hence O(|E|). We claim that we scan each edge at most once, with O(|E|)
exceptions. From the update on pb, we see that the only time an edge ab is scanned more than once is when
a rotation is eliminated and b = b`−1, a = a`. We call this an exception. Since every rotation corresponds to
at most one exception, the number of exceptions does not exceed the number of rotations, which is O(|E|).
Note that each time we check if pb > deg(b), we either find a sink (which happens at most once per iteration),
or we scan an edge (which has been shown to happen O(|E|) times). Hence, the number of times we compare
pb and deg(b) is O(|E|). In addition, the number of times we check if nextMi(bj) ∈W i is upper bounded by
the number of edge scans, hence O(|E|). The number of individual entry updates when
:::::::::::
constructing
:::::
Mi+1
::::
from
::::
Mi, ::::P
i+1
:::::
from
:::
P i and
:::::
W i+1
:::::
from
::::
W i in case (2) is upper bounded by the number of edges in all
rotations from SR(GL, <,q), which is O(|E|) from Theorem A.1, part 3 and Lemma A.4, concluding the
proof. 
B.3 Proof of Lemma 7.10
Proof. The implementation follows as in the proof of Theorem 5.7. The only modification regards the update
of T i+1 in case (1) considered in the proof, which is when extending the chain P i, we encounter a node bj
that is a sink. If aj consents, then the update on T
i+1 remains unchanged, which is to set T i+1 := T i∪{bj};
however, if aj is nonconsenting, we set T
i+1 := T i ∪ {bj , bj−1}. Correctness analysis and the counting
arguments used for time complexity analysis in the proof of Theorem 5.7 remain valid and can be extended
to conclude the proof here. 
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C Proof of Outcome-Equivalence
C.1 Proof of Thereom 7.8
Proof. To distinguish between notations in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4, we use Mi (subscripts) to represent
the assignment at iteration i in Algorithm 4, and M i (superscripts) for the assignment in Algorithm 3.
We use Gi to represent instances generated during Algorithm 3, and Hi to represent instances generated
during Algorithm 4. Underdemanded schools Bi’s are for Algorithm 3 only; and rotation digraph DBi for
Algorithm 4 is abbreviated by Di. We call each while loop of Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 an iteration
and a loop, respectively. Note that loop i takes assignment Mi−1 from the previous loop and produce Mi.
Similarly, iteration i starts with M i−1 and outputs M i.
Because of Lemma 7.5, it suffices to show that there is a specific execution of Algorithm 4 whose output
coincides with that of Algorithm 3. In particular, we consider an execution of Algorithm 4 in which loops
are partitioned in consecutive batches, as follows. In the first batch, we eliminate any rotation that is found
in the rotation digraph, but we can only enter the else clause in Step 8 if the sink b, described in case (ii)
of Step 5, is a sink in D0. After repeating this, we arrive at a loop j1 where D
j1 has no cycles, and none
of its sinks with positive indegree is a sink in D0. This is when the second batch starts. We call j1 the last
iteration of the first batch. Similarly, in the next batch, we can only enter the else clause if the sink b in
case (ii) is a sink in Dj1 , and define j2, j3, ... analogously. Let k be the last iteration of Algorithm 3. In
the following paragraphs, we will show by induction that for all i = 0, 1, · · · , k, we have Mji = M i, where
j0 = 0, and D
ji is the rotation digraph of M i in (Gi, <,q) (Note that by construction, M i is stable in Gi).
The base case is when i = ji = 0. The claim holds because M
0 = M0 is the student-optimal stable
assignment in (G0, <,q), and D0 is the rotation digraph of M0 in (G0, <,q) since G0 = H0. Next, assume
the claim is true for all indices t ≤ i, and we show it for i+ 1. That is, we consider the loops in the (i+ 1)th
batch of Algorithm 4. As described above, in this batch, we can only enter the else clause if the sink b in case
(ii) is a sink in Dji , and those are exactly Bi (i.e., underdemanded schools in M i) by inductive hypothesis
and by Lemma 7.6.
Fix b ∈ B. Define the following sets: S is the set of a ∈ A such that (b, a) ∈ A(Dh) for some loop
h ∈ [ji, ji+1]; Ei (resp. Einc) is the set of edges removed in some iteration 1, . . . , i of Algorithm 3 at Step 8
(resp. Step 10). We will show the following:
(i). If b ∈ Bi, then S = ∅.
If b ∈ Bi, it is a sink in Dji by Lemma 7.6 and the inductive hypothesis. Moreover, it remains a sink in
Dh for all h ≥ ji by Lemma 7.7. Thus, S = ∅.
(ii). If (b, a) ∈ Dh for some h ∈ [ji, ji+1], then ab /∈ Ei+1nc .
Assume by contradiction that for some a ∈ S, ab ∈ Ei+1nc . Then, there must be an iteration t ≤ i and
a nonconsenting student a′ such that a′ >b a, M
t(a′) ∈ Bt \ Bt−1, and b >a′ M t(a′) in Gt. Hence, in
Algorithm 3, both ab and a′b are removed when graph Gt+1 is created. Since M t is stable in (Gt, <,q) and
a′b ∈ E(Gt), we must have M t(b) >b a′. By inductive hypothesis, we know M t = Mjt ; and by Lemmas 7.6
and 7.7, we know that school Mjt(a
′) is a sink in Djt , and Mt′(a′) = Mjt(a
′) remains a sink for all t′ ≥ jt.
Thus, there must be  ∈ [jt, h) such that (b, a′) ∈ A(D). In particular, M(a′) is a sink in D. Hence,
we can wlog assume  is the loop during which Algorithm 4 removes the edge a′b. Since a′ >b a, we must
have (b, a) /∈ A(Dr) for all r ≤ . In addition, since a′ is nonconsenting, Step 11 of Algorithm 4 removes
edge ab from the instance at the same loop . Hence, (b, a) /∈ A(Dh) for any loop h, which implies a /∈ S, a
contradiction.
(iii). Let a ∈ S, and (b, a) ∈ Dh for some h ∈ [ji, ji+1]. If Mh(a) ∈ Bi, then (b, a) is not part of a directed
cycle in Dh
′
for all h′ ≥ ji + 1. If (b, a) ∈ Dji+1 , then Mji(a) /∈ Bi.
The first part follows from Lemma 7.6 and Lemma 7.7. The second part follows from the definition of
ji+1.
(iv). Let a ∈ S and (b, a) ∈ Dh for some h ∈ [ji, ji+1]. If Mh(a) /∈ Bi and Mh ⊆ E(Gi+1), then a = sMh(b)
in (Gi+1, <,q).
We will first show that ab ∈ E(Gi+1). If not, then we must have ab ∈ Ei+1, as we already showed in (ii)
that ab /∈ Ei+1nc . However, ab ∈ Ei+1 implies Mji(a) = M i(a) ∈ Bi and thus Mh(a) ∈ Bi by Lemma 7.6 and
Lemma 7.7, a contradiction. Since a = sMh(b) in (H
h, <,q), we only need to show that a is the first student,
in Gi+1, on b’s preference list that prefers b to his assigned school. Assume by contradiction that there exists
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another student a′ such that a′ >b a, b >a′ Mh(a
′), and a′b ∈ E(Gi+1) but a′b /∈ E(Hh). If a′b is removed
at Step 11 of Algorithm 4, then ab must also be removed at the same loop, contradicting a = sMh(b). Thus,
a′b must be removed at Step 9 of some loop. That is, there must exist a loop h < h, where h ∈ [jı, jı+1)
for some ı ≤ i, such that (b, a′) ∈ A(Dh) and Mh(a′) ∈ Bı. However, this means a′b ∈ Eı+1 ⊆ Ei+1, which
contradicts the assumption that a′b ∈ E(Gi+1).
We now combine (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) for all schools in B. (iv) and the first part of (iii) imply that if Dh
has a directed cycle for some h ∈ [ji, ji+1], then the directed cycle corresponds to a rotation exposed at Mh
in (Gi+1, <,q). That is, if Mji = M
i ∈ S(Gi+1, <,q), all assignments obtained in this batch of Algorithm 4
are stable assignments in (Gi+1, <,q). To see M i ∈ S(Gi+1, <,q), consider the edges removed from Gi to
obtain Gi+1 in Algorithm 3. It is easy to see that none of the edges removed are in M i. Thus, M i is an
assignment in Gi+1. Moreover, since the order in preference lists remains from iteration to iteration, M i
is stable in (Gi+1, <,q). Hence, the last assignment obtained at this batch, Mji+1 in particular, is a stable
assignment in (Gi+1, <,q). Furthermore, by the second part of (iii) and (iv), we know Dji+1 is the rotation
digraph of Mji+1 in (G
i+1, <,q). By choice of ji+1, D
ji+1 contains no directed cycles, which means there are
no exposed rotations at Mji+1 in (G
i+1, <,q). Thus, Mji+1 must be the student-optimal stable assignment
in (Gi+1, <,q), which coincides with M i+1. This concludes the proof of the induction.
Finally, consider the last batch of Algorithm 4. By Lemma 7.6, sinks in Djk are exactly underdemanded
schools in Mk. Moreover, by the termination criterion of Algorithm 3, all schools are underdemanded in
Mk. Thus, Djk only has sinks and Algorithm 4 may terminates with Mjk , which is the same assignment as
Mk. 
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